Matches in DBpedia 2014 for { ?s ?p Strategic Allied victoryref|Milton Shulman explains that due to the attacks around the city of Caen 7 out of the 10 German Panzer Divisions were facing the Anglo-Canadian forces when the American armies launched Operation Cobra. He continues "What better justification for the strategy adopted by Allied planners to attract to the anvil of Caen the bulk of German armour and there methodically hammer it to bits!" Ellis echoes these thoughts: "Twenty-First Army Group's persistent pressure had compelled Rommel to make good a shortage of infantry by using his armour defensively. The strongest armoured divisions were clustered around that eastern flank until the American army had reached a position from which it was ready to break through the less heavily guarded western front." Richard Overy states that von Kluge warned Hitler that the German left flank had collapsed following Operation Cobra and "The choice was between holding at Caen and abandoning western France, or dividing German forces between two battles, and risking collapse in both." Hitler compromised; the German army would hold in front of Caen while armoured forces were diverted to tackle the American attack. "The result was predictable. Strong British and Canadian thrusts both sides of Caen immobilised the German forces and intercepted those driving towards the American front." While one historian, Ken Ford, calls the battle for Caen a pyrrhic victory the War Office had expected 21st Army Group to have 65,751 casualties inflicted upon it by 7 August however by that time 21st Army Group had lost 50,539 casualties. High losses had been expected but that level of casualties had not been reached therefore the definition of pyrrhic victory appears not be appropriate.|group=nb. }
Showing items 1 to 1 of
1
with 100 items per page.
- Battle_for_Caen result "Strategic Allied victoryref|Milton Shulman explains that due to the attacks around the city of Caen 7 out of the 10 German Panzer Divisions were facing the Anglo-Canadian forces when the American armies launched Operation Cobra. He continues "What better justification for the strategy adopted by Allied planners to attract to the anvil of Caen the bulk of German armour and there methodically hammer it to bits!" Ellis echoes these thoughts: "Twenty-First Army Group's persistent pressure had compelled Rommel to make good a shortage of infantry by using his armour defensively. The strongest armoured divisions were clustered around that eastern flank until the American army had reached a position from which it was ready to break through the less heavily guarded western front." Richard Overy states that von Kluge warned Hitler that the German left flank had collapsed following Operation Cobra and "The choice was between holding at Caen and abandoning western France, or dividing German forces between two battles, and risking collapse in both." Hitler compromised; the German army would hold in front of Caen while armoured forces were diverted to tackle the American attack. "The result was predictable. Strong British and Canadian thrusts both sides of Caen immobilised the German forces and intercepted those driving towards the American front." While one historian, Ken Ford, calls the battle for Caen a pyrrhic victory the War Office had expected 21st Army Group to have 65,751 casualties inflicted upon it by 7 August however by that time 21st Army Group had lost 50,539 casualties. High losses had been expected but that level of casualties had not been reached therefore the definition of pyrrhic victory appears not be appropriate.|group=nb".