Matches in Harvard for { <http://id.lib.harvard.edu/aleph/007359964/catalog> ?p ?o. }
Showing items 1 to 20 of
20
with 100 items per page.
- catalog abstract "Political and property rights theories predict that privatization will produce a tighter alignment of managerial rewards and penalties with firm financial performance. Critics question the practical existence of any important corporate governance changes following privatization, challenging such theories and fueling proposals to impose tighter regulations on privatized firms. This paper evaluates these competing claims using data from 95 UK state-owned, privatized and publicly-traded firms between 1970-1995. The data set includes management resignation information, various firm performance measures, manager-specific attributes, industry-specific attributes and controls for economy-wide trends. Our measure of incentives is the sensitivity of management resignation to changes in firm financial performance. We find strong evidence of a statistically and economically meaningful relationship between the probability of dismissal and firm performance changes in privatized firms and not in state-owned firms. Simulations using predicted coefficient estimates and mean managerial and firm characteristics show that an increase in performance from one standard deviation above the mean reduces the probability of being fired in privatized firms by more than 60% but has no effect in state-owned firms.".
- catalog contributor b10159925.
- catalog contributor b10159926.
- catalog created "1996.".
- catalog date "1996".
- catalog date "1996.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "1996.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. [45-47]).".
- catalog description "Political and property rights theories predict that privatization will produce a tighter alignment of managerial rewards and penalties with firm financial performance. Critics question the practical existence of any important corporate governance changes following privatization, challenging such theories and fueling proposals to impose tighter regulations on privatized firms. This paper evaluates these competing claims using data from 95 UK state-owned, privatized and publicly-traded firms between 1970-1995. The data set includes management resignation information, various firm performance measures, manager-specific attributes, industry-specific attributes and controls for economy-wide trends. Our measure of incentives is the sensitivity of management resignation to changes in firm financial performance. We find strong evidence of a statistically and economically meaningful relationship between the probability of dismissal and firm performance changes in privatized firms and not in state-owned firms. Simulations using predicted coefficient estimates and mean managerial and firm characteristics show that an increase in performance from one standard deviation above the mean reduces the probability of being fired in privatized firms by more than 60% but has no effect in state-owned firms.".
- catalog extent "48 p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research) ; 97-000.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 97-045".
- catalog issued "1996".
- catalog issued "1996.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog spatial "Great Britain.".
- catalog subject "Privatization Great Britain.".
- catalog title "Management control and privatization in the United Kingdom : a quiet life disturbed / Michael Ian Cragg, I.J. Alexander Dyck.".
- catalog type "text".