Matches in ScholarlyData for { ?s ?p ?o. }
- 1105 hasAuthorList authorList.
- 1105 isPartOf proceedings.
- 1105 keyword "Wikipedia".
- 1105 keyword "decentralized search".
- 1105 keyword "goal prediction".
- 1105 keyword "human navigation".
- 1105 title "Human Wayfinding in Information Networks".
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- item-1 hasContent robert-west.
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- item-2 hasContent jure-leskovec.
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- 1110 creator andrzej-skrzypacz.
- 1110 creator george-varghese.
- 1110 creator kunal-punera.
- 1110 creator patrick-jordan.
- 1110 creator uri-nadav.
- 1110 type InProceedings.
- 1110 label "Lattice Games and the Economics of Aggregators".
- 1110 sameAs 1110.
- 1110 abstract "We model the strategic decisions of web sites in content markets, where sites may reduce user search cost by aggregating content. Example aggregations include political news, technology, and other niche-topic websites. We model this market scenario as an extensive form game of complete information, where sites choose a set of content to aggregate and users associate with sites that are nearest to their interests. Thus, our scenario is a location game in which sites choose to aggregate content at a certain point in user-preference space, and our choice of distance metric, Jacquard distance, induces a lattice structure on the game. We provide two variants of this scenario: one where users associate with the first site to enter amongst sites of equal distances, and a second where users choose uniformly between sites at equal distances. We show that Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria exist for both games. While it appears to be computationally hard to compute equilibria in both games, we show a polynomial-time satisficing strategy called Frontier Descent for the first game. A satisficing strategy is not a best response but ensures that earlier sites will have positive profits, assuming all subsequent sites also have positive profits. By contrast, we show that the second game has no satisficing solution.".
- 1110 hasAuthorList authorList.
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- 1110 keyword "content aggregation".
- 1110 keyword "content ecosystem".
- 1110 keyword "websites and weblogs".
- 1110 title "Lattice Games and the Economics of Aggregators".
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- item-1 hasContent patrick-jordan.
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- item-2 hasContent uri-nadav.
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- item-3 hasContent kunal-punera.
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- item-4 hasContent andrzej-skrzypacz.
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- item-5 hasContent george-varghese.
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- 1131 creator alex-beutel.
- 1131 creator b-aditya-prakash.
- 1131 creator christos-faloutsos.
- 1131 creator roni-rosenfeld.
- 1131 type InProceedings.
- 1131 label "Winner Takes All: Competing Viruses or Ideas on fair-play Networks".
- 1131 sameAs 1131.
- 1131 abstract "Given two competing products (or memes, or viruses etc.) spreading over a given network, can we predict what will happen at the end, that is, which product will 'win', in terms of highest market share? One may naively expect that the better product (stronger virus) will just have a larger footprint, proportional to the quality ratio of the products (or strength ratio of the viruses). However, we prove the surprising result that, under realistic conditions, for any graph topology, the stronger virus completely wipes-out the weaker one, thus not merely `winning' but `taking it all'. In addition to the proofs, we also demonstrate our result with simulations over diverse, real graph topologies, including the social-contact graph of the city of Portland OR (about 31 million edges and 1 million nodes) and internet AS router graphs. Finally, we also provide real data about competing products from Google-Insights, like Facebook-Myspace, and we show again that they agree with our analysis.".
- 1131 hasAuthorList authorList.
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- 1131 keyword "competing viruses".
- 1131 keyword "network".
- 1131 keyword "propagation".
- 1131 title "Winner Takes All: Competing Viruses or Ideas on fair-play Networks".
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- item-1 hasContent b-aditya-prakash.
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- item-2 hasContent alex-beutel.
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- item-3 hasContent roni-rosenfeld.
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- item-4 hasContent christos-faloutsos.
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- 1134 creator arpita-ghosh.
- 1134 creator preston-mcafee.
- 1134 type InProceedings.
- 1134 label "Crowdsourcing with Endogenous Entry".
- 1134 sameAs 1134.
- 1134 abstract "We investigate the design of mechanisms to incentivize high quality outcomes in crowdsourcing environments with strategic agents, when entry is an {\em endogenous}, strategic choice. Modeling endogenous entry in crowdsourcing markets is important because there is a nonzero cost to making a contribution of any quality, which can be avoided by not participating, and indeed many sites based on crowdsourced content do not have adequate participation. We use a mechanism with monotone, rank-based rewards in a model where agents strategically make participation and quality choices, to capture a wide variety of crowdsourcing environments, ranging from conventional crowdsourcing contests with monetary rewards such as TopCoder, to crowdsourced content such as in online Q&A forums. We begin by explicitly constructing the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium for such monotone rank-order mechanisms, and use the participation probability and distribution of qualities from this construction to address the question of designing incentives for two kinds of rewards that arise in the context of crowdsourcing. We first show that for attention rewards, that arise in the crowdsourced {\em content} setting, the entire equilibrium distribution and therefore every increasing statistic, including the maximum and average quality (accounting for participation) improves when the rewards for every rank but the last are as high as possible. In particular, when the cost of producing the lowest possible quality content is low, the optimal mechanism displays all but the poorest contribution. We next investigate how to allocate reward amongst participants in settings where there is a fixed total reward that can be arbitrarily allocated amongst participants, as in crowdsourcing contests. Unlike in models with exogenous entry, here the expected number of participants can be increased by subsidizing entry, which can potentially improve the expected value of the best contribution. However, we show that subsidizing entry does not improve the expected value of the maximum quality, although it may improve the expected value of the total contributions. In fact, we show that free entry is dominated by taxing entry - making all entrants pay a small fee, which is rebated to the winner along with whatever rewards were already assigned, can improve the quality of the best contribution over a winner-take-all contest with no taxes.".