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- Dual_EC_DRBG abstract "Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual_EC_DRBG) is a claimed cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) standardized by ANSI, ISO, and formerly by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Dual_EC_DRBG is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) and was for some time one of the four (now three) CSPRNGs standardized in NIST SP 800-90A.In 2007 a possible backdoor was discovered with Dual_EC_DRBG's design, with the design of Dual_EC_DRBG having the unusual property that it was theoretically impossible for anyone but Dual_EC_DRBG's designers (NSA) to confirm the backdoor's existence. Doubts about Dual_EC_DRBG's security and performance had also been expressed even before it was standardized. Bruce Schneier concluded shortly after standardization that the "rather obvious" backdoor (along with other deficiencies) would mean that nobody would use Dual_EC_DRBG. In 2013, New York Times reported that documents "appear to confirm" that the backdoor was real, and had been deliberately inserted by the National Security Agency as part of the NSA's Bullrun decryption program. The alleged backdoor would allow NSA to decrypt for example SSL/TLS encryption which used Dual_EC_DRBG as a CSPRNG. In December 2013, a Reuters news article alleged that in 2004, before NIST standardized Dual_EC_DRBG, NSA paid RSA Security $10 million in a secret deal to use Dual_EC_DRBG as the default in the RSA BSAFE cryptography library, which resulted in RSA Security becoming the most important distributor of the backdoored algorithm. RSA responded to this and subsequent media reports to "categorically deny" any insinuation that RSA had ever knowingly colluded with the NSA to incorporate a flaw in Dual_EC_DRBG, saying "we have never kept [our] relationship [with the NSA] a secret".Members of the ANSI standard group, to which Dual_EC_DRBG was first submitted, were aware of the exact mechanism of the potential backdoor and how to disable it, but did not take sufficient steps to unconditionally disable the backdoor. The general cryptographic community was initially not aware of the potential backdoor, until of Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson 2007 rediscovery, or of Certicom's Daniel R. L. Brown and Scott Vanstone's 2005 patent application describing the backdoor mechanism.In September 2013, The New York Times reported that internal NSA memos leaked by Edward Snowden indicated that the NSA had worked during the standardization process to eventually become the sole editor of the Dual_EC_DRBG standard, and concluded that the Dual_EC_DRBG standard did indeed contain a backdoor for the NSA. As response, NIST stated that "NIST would not deliberately weaken a cryptographic standard."According to the New York Times story, the NSA spends $250 million per year to insert backdoors in software and hardware as part of the Bullrun program. A Presidential advisory committee subsequently set up to examine NSA's conduct recommended among other things that the US government "fully support and not undermine efforts to create encryption standards".In April 21st, 2014, NIST withdrew Dual EC_DRBG from its draft guidance on random number generators recommending "current users of Dual_EC_DRBG transition to one of the three remaining approved algorithms as quickly as possible."".
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink download;jsessionid=D96134C539F238DD741A65F49189E076?doi=10.1.1.6.1272&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink SP800-90A.pdf.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink 117.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink 10.1007%2F978-3-540-74143-5_26.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink 10.1007%2FBFb0052241.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink 15-shumow.pdf.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink msg03651.html.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink dual-ec-drbg-comments.pdf.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink securitymatters_1115.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageExternalLink 8101758.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageID "14259066".
- Dual_EC_DRBG wikiPageRevisionID "605611304".
- Dual_EC_DRBG hasPhotoCollection Dual_EC_DRBG.
- Dual_EC_DRBG subject Category:Articles_with_underscores_in_the_title.
- Dual_EC_DRBG subject Category:Broken_cryptography_algorithms.
- Dual_EC_DRBG subject Category:Conspiracy_theories.
- Dual_EC_DRBG subject Category:Kleptography.
- Dual_EC_DRBG subject Category:National_Institute_of_Standards_and_Technology.
- Dual_EC_DRBG subject Category:National_Security_Agency.
- Dual_EC_DRBG subject Category:Pseudorandom_number_generators.
- Dual_EC_DRBG type Apparatus102727825.
- Dual_EC_DRBG type Artifact100021939.
- Dual_EC_DRBG type Equipment103294048.
- Dual_EC_DRBG type Generator103434188.
- Dual_EC_DRBG type Instrumentality103575240.
- Dual_EC_DRBG type Object100002684.
- Dual_EC_DRBG type PhysicalEntity100001930.
- Dual_EC_DRBG type PseudorandomNumberGenerators.
- Dual_EC_DRBG type Whole100003553.
- Dual_EC_DRBG comment "Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual_EC_DRBG) is a claimed cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) standardized by ANSI, ISO, and formerly by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).".
- Dual_EC_DRBG label "Dual EC DRBG".
- Dual_EC_DRBG label "Dual EC DRBG".
- Dual_EC_DRBG label "Dual EC DRBG".
- Dual_EC_DRBG label "Dual EC DRBG".
- Dual_EC_DRBG sameAs Dual_EC_DRBG.
- Dual_EC_DRBG sameAs Dual_EC_DRBG.
- Dual_EC_DRBG sameAs m.03czg2t.
- Dual_EC_DRBG sameAs Q309607.
- Dual_EC_DRBG sameAs Q309607.
- Dual_EC_DRBG sameAs Dual_EC_DRBG.
- Dual_EC_DRBG wasDerivedFrom Dual_EC_DRBG?oldid=605611304.
- Dual_EC_DRBG isPrimaryTopicOf Dual_EC_DRBG.