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- Essentially_contested_concept abstract "In a paper delivered to the Aristotelian Society on 12 March 1956, Walter Bryce Gallie (1912–1998) introduced the term essentially contested concept to facilitate an understanding of the different applications or interpretations of the sorts of abstract, qualitative, and evaluative notions — such as "art" and "social justice" — used in the domains of aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion.Garver (1978) describes their use as follows:The term essentially contested concepts gives a name to a problematic situation that many people recognize: that in certain kinds of talk there is a variety of meanings employed for key terms in an argument, and there is a feeling that dogmatism (“My answer is right and all others are wrong”), skepticism (“All answers are equally true (or false); everyone has a right to his own truth”), and eclecticism (“Each meaning gives a partial view so the more meanings the better”) are none of them the appropriate attitude towards that variety of meanings.Essentially contested concepts involve widespread agreement on a concept (e.g., "fairness"), but not on the best realization thereof.They are "concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users", and these disputes "cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone".".
- Essentially_contested_concept wikiPageExternalLink 10204.
- Essentially_contested_concept wikiPageExternalLink Collier%20Gallie.pdf.
- Essentially_contested_concept wikiPageID "5843994".
- Essentially_contested_concept wikiPageRevisionID "586436173".
- Essentially_contested_concept hasPhotoCollection Essentially_contested_concept.
- Essentially_contested_concept subject Category:Concepts_in_aesthetics.
- Essentially_contested_concept subject Category:Philosophical_concepts.
- Essentially_contested_concept subject Category:Philosophy_of_religion.
- Essentially_contested_concept subject Category:Rhetoric.
- Essentially_contested_concept subject Category:Social_concepts.
- Essentially_contested_concept type Abstraction100002137.
- Essentially_contested_concept type Cognition100023271.
- Essentially_contested_concept type Concept105835747.
- Essentially_contested_concept type ConceptsInAesthetics.
- Essentially_contested_concept type Content105809192.
- Essentially_contested_concept type Idea105833840.
- Essentially_contested_concept type PhilosophicalConcepts.
- Essentially_contested_concept type PsychologicalFeature100023100.
- Essentially_contested_concept type SocialConcepts.
- Essentially_contested_concept comment "In a paper delivered to the Aristotelian Society on 12 March 1956, Walter Bryce Gallie (1912–1998) introduced the term essentially contested concept to facilitate an understanding of the different applications or interpretations of the sorts of abstract, qualitative, and evaluative notions — such as "art" and "social justice" — used in the domains of aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion.Garver (1978) describes their use as follows:The term essentially contested concepts gives a name to a problematic situation that many people recognize: that in certain kinds of talk there is a variety of meanings employed for key terms in an argument, and there is a feeling that dogmatism (“My answer is right and all others are wrong”), skepticism (“All answers are equally true (or false); everyone has a right to his own truth”), and eclecticism (“Each meaning gives a partial view so the more meanings the better”) are none of them the appropriate attitude towards that variety of meanings.Essentially contested concepts involve widespread agreement on a concept (e.g., "fairness"), but not on the best realization thereof.They are "concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users", and these disputes "cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone".".
- Essentially_contested_concept label "Concept essentiellement contesté".
- Essentially_contested_concept label "Essentially Contested Concept".
- Essentially_contested_concept label "Essentially contested concept".
- Essentially_contested_concept label "Essentially contested concept".
- Essentially_contested_concept sameAs Essentially_Contested_Concept.
- Essentially_contested_concept sameAs Concept_essentiellement_contesté.
- Essentially_contested_concept sameAs Essentially_contested_concept.
- Essentially_contested_concept sameAs m.0677fp3.
- Essentially_contested_concept sameAs Q576639.
- Essentially_contested_concept sameAs Q576639.
- Essentially_contested_concept sameAs Essentially_contested_concept.
- Essentially_contested_concept wasDerivedFrom Essentially_contested_concept?oldid=586436173.
- Essentially_contested_concept isPrimaryTopicOf Essentially_contested_concept.