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- catalog contributor b10467096.
- catalog created "1997.".
- catalog date "1997".
- catalog date "1997.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "1997.".
- catalog description "1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action -- 2. Quality Uncertainty and the 'Market for Lemons' -- 3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model -- 4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence -- 5. Job Market Signalling -- 6. Screening: A Self-selection Mechanism -- 7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory -- 8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence -- 9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations -- 10. Moral Hazard: A Principal -- Agent Model -- 11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory -- 12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence -- 13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example -- 14. Auction Design: Theory -- 15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence -- 16. Concluding Comments -- App. Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Bayes' Rule, Expected Utility and Game Theory.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references and index.".
- catalog extent "x, 262 p. :".
- catalog identifier "0631201521 (alk. paper)".
- catalog identifier "0631206663 (pbk. : alk. paper)".
- catalog issued "1997".
- catalog issued "1997.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Oxford ; Malden, Mass. : Blackwell,".
- catalog subject "306.4/2 21".
- catalog subject "Decision making.".
- catalog subject "HB133 .M65 1997".
- catalog subject "Information theory in economics.".
- catalog subject "Uncertainty.".
- catalog tableOfContents "1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action -- 2. Quality Uncertainty and the 'Market for Lemons' -- 3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model -- 4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence -- 5. Job Market Signalling -- 6. Screening: A Self-selection Mechanism -- 7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory -- 8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence -- 9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations -- 10. Moral Hazard: A Principal -- Agent Model -- 11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory -- 12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence -- 13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example -- 14. Auction Design: Theory -- 15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence -- 16. Concluding Comments -- App. Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Bayes' Rule, Expected Utility and Game Theory.".
- catalog title "The economics of information : lying and cheating in markets and organizations / Ian Molho.".
- catalog type "text".