Matches in UGent Biblio for { <https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/1935811#aggregation> ?p ?o. }
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- aggregation classification "B2".
- aggregation creator person.
- aggregation date "2011".
- aggregation format "application/pdf".
- aggregation hasFormat 1935811.bibtex.
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- aggregation isPartOf urn:isbn:9782705682156.
- aggregation language "fre".
- aggregation publisher "Hermann".
- aggregation rights "I have transferred the copyright for this publication to the publisher".
- aggregation subject "Philosophy and Religion".
- aggregation title "Eléments pour une théorie matérialiste du soi".
- aggregation abstract "The concept of self has preeminently been asserted (in its many versions) by anti-reductionist, anti-naturalistic philosophical positions, from Descartes to Husserl and beyond, with the exception of some hybrid or intermediate positions which declare rather glibly that, since we are biological entities which fully belong to the natural world, and we are conscious of ourselves as 'selves', therefore the self belongs to the natural world (Merleau-Ponty, Varela). My goal in this paper is to argue for a theory of the self according to which (1) the self belongs to the world of external relations (Spinoza), such that no one fact, including supposedly private facts, is only accessible to a single person; (2) the self can be reconstructed as a "sense of organic unity," partly analogous to what has been described as "biological individuality" (from Diderot to Goldstein, Canguilhem, Simondon); yet this should not lead us to espouse a Romantic concept of organism (3) what we call 'self' might simply be a dynamic process of interpretive activity within a "world," undertaken by the brain. This materialist theory of the self should not neglect the nature of experience, but it should also not have to take at face value the recurring invocations of a better, deeper "first-person perspective" or "first-person science." As Althusser said, the materialist philosopher is the person who catches the train already in motion; the world is more fundamental than the thinker.".
- aggregation authorList BK1395524.
- aggregation endPage "149".
- aggregation startPage "123".
- aggregation aggregates 1935822.
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