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- aggregation classification "A1".
- aggregation creator person.
- aggregation creator person.
- aggregation creator person.
- aggregation date "2011".
- aggregation format "application/pdf".
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- aggregation isPartOf urn:issn:0001-5342.
- aggregation language "eng".
- aggregation rights "I have transferred the copyright for this publication to the publisher".
- aggregation subject "Philosophy and Religion".
- aggregation title "Normative ethics does not need a foundation: it needs more science".
- aggregation abstract "The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights.".
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- aggregation endPage "51".
- aggregation issue "1".
- aggregation startPage "29".
- aggregation volume "59".
- aggregation aggregates 926842.
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