Data Portal @ linkeddatafragments.org

Matches in Harvard for { <http://id.lib.harvard.edu/aleph/001999553/catalog> ?p ?o. }

• catalog abstract "The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.".
• catalog contributor b2880977.
• catalog created "1990.".
• catalog date "1990".
• catalog date "1990.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "1990.".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-270) and index.".
• catalog description "Series editors' preface -- Preface -- Reflections on the commons -- An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations -- Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed CPRs -- Analyzing institutional change -- Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities -- A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs -- Notes -- References -- Index.".
• catalog description "The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.".
• catalog extent "xviii, 280 p. :".
• catalog identifier "0521371015 (hardback)".
• catalog identifier "0521405998 (paperback)".
• catalog identifier "9780521371018 (hardback)".
• catalog identifier "9780521405997 (paperback)".
• catalog isPartOf "Political economy of institutions and decisions".
• catalog issued "1990".
• catalog issued "1990.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press,".
• catalog subject "333.2 20".
• catalog subject "Commons Case studies.".
• catalog subject "Commons.".
• catalog subject "HD1286 .O87 1991".
• catalog subject "Social choice Case studies.".
• catalog subject "Social choice.".
• catalog tableOfContents "Series editors' preface -- Preface -- Reflections on the commons -- An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations -- Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed CPRs -- Analyzing institutional change -- Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities -- A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs -- Notes -- References -- Index.".
• catalog title "Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action / Elinor Ostrom.".
• catalog type "Case studies. fast".
• catalog type "text".