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• catalog abstract "In November of 1964, as Lyndon Johnson celebrated his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, the government of South Vietnam lay in a shambles. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor described it as a country beset by "chronic factionalism, civilian-military suspicion and distrust, absence of national spirit and motivation, lack of cohesion in the social structure, lack of experience in the conduct of government." Virtually no one in the Johnson Administration believed that Saigon could defeat the communist insurgency--and yet by July of 1965, a mere nine months later, they would lock the United States on a path toward massive military intervention which would ultimately destroy Johnson's presidency and polarize the American people. Into the Quagmire presents a closely rendered, almost day-by-day account of America's deepening involvement in Vietnam during those crucial nine months. Mining a wealth of recently opened material at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and elsewhere, Brian VanDeMark vividly depicts the painful unfolding of a national tragedy. We meet an LBJ forever fearful of a conservative backlash, which he felt would doom his Great Society, an unsure and troubled leader grappling with the unwanted burden of Vietnam; George Ball, a maverick on Vietnam, whose carefully reasoned (and, in retrospect, strikingly prescient) stand against escalation was discounted by Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy; and Clark Clifford, whose last-minute effort at a pivotal meeting at Camp David failed to dissuade Johnson from doubling the number of ground troops in Vietnam. What comes across strongly throughout the book is the deep pessimism of all the major participants as things grew worse--neither LBJ, nor Bundy, nor McNamara, nor Rusk felt confident that things would improve in South Vietnam, that there was any reasonable chance for victory, or that the South had the will or the ability to prevail against the North. And yet deeper into the quagmire they went.".
• catalog contributor b2894848.
• catalog coverage "United States Politics and government 1963-1969.".
• catalog created "1991.".
• catalog date "1991".
• catalog date "1991.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "1991.".
• catalog description "In November of 1964, as Lyndon Johnson celebrated his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, the government of South Vietnam lay in a shambles. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor described it as a country beset by "chronic factionalism, civilian-military suspicion and distrust, absence of national spirit and motivation, lack of cohesion in the social structure, lack of experience in the conduct of government." Virtually no one in the Johnson Administration believed that Saigon could defeat the communist insurgency--and yet by July of 1965, a mere nine months later, they would lock the United States on a path toward massive military intervention which would ultimately destroy Johnson's presidency and polarize the American people. Into the Quagmire presents a closely rendered, almost day-by-day account of America's deepening involvement in Vietnam during those crucial nine months. Mining a wealth of recently opened material at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and elsewhere, Brian VanDeMark vividly depicts the painful unfolding of a national tragedy. We meet an LBJ forever fearful of a conservative backlash, which he felt would doom his Great Society, an unsure and troubled leader grappling with the unwanted burden of Vietnam; George Ball, a maverick on Vietnam, whose carefully reasoned (and, in retrospect, strikingly prescient) stand against escalation was discounted by Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy; and Clark Clifford, whose last-minute effort at a pivotal meeting at Camp David failed to dissuade Johnson from doubling the number of ground troops in Vietnam. What comes across strongly throughout the book is the deep pessimism of all the major participants as things grew worse--neither LBJ, nor Bundy, nor McNamara, nor Rusk felt confident that things would improve in South Vietnam, that there was any reasonable chance for victory, or that the South had the will or the ability to prevail against the North. And yet deeper into the quagmire they went.".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-238) and index.".
• catalog description "To the crossroads in Vietnam -- "The day of reckoning is coming" -- "Stable government or no stable government" -- "A bear by the tail" -- "Where are we going?" -- "If I were Ho Chi Minh, I would never negotiate" -- "What in the world is happening?" -- "Can you stop it?" -- "Better 'n owl".".
• catalog extent "xvi, 268 p. ;".
• catalog identifier "0195065069 (alk. paper)".
• catalog issued "1991".
• catalog issued "1991.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "New York : Oxford University Press,".
• catalog spatial "United States Politics and government 1963-1969.".
• catalog spatial "United States.".
• catalog subject "959.704/3373 20".
• catalog subject "DS558 .V36 1991".
• catalog subject "Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973.".
• catalog subject "Vietnam War, 1961-1975 United States.".
• catalog tableOfContents "To the crossroads in Vietnam -- "The day of reckoning is coming" -- "Stable government or no stable government" -- "A bear by the tail" -- "Where are we going?" -- "If I were Ho Chi Minh, I would never negotiate" -- "What in the world is happening?" -- "Can you stop it?" -- "Better 'n owl".".
• catalog title "Into the quagmire : Lyndon Johnson and the escalation of the Vietnam War / Brian VanDeMark.".
• catalog type "text".