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- catalog contributor b3272181.
- catalog contributor b3272182.
- catalog created "c1991.".
- catalog date "1991".
- catalog date "c1991.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c1991.".
- catalog description "I. Static games of complete information -- 1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium -- 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- II. Dynamic games of complete information -- 3. Extensive-form games -- 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions -- 5. Repeated games -- III. Static games of incomplete information -- 6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium -- 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information -- 8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection -- 9. Reputation effects -- 10. Sequential bargining under incomplete information -- V. Advanced topics -- 11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, in iterated weak dominance -- 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games -- 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium -- 14. Common knowledge and games -- Index.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references and index.".
- catalog extent "xxiii, 579 p. :".
- catalog identifier "0262061414 (hc)".
- catalog issued "1991".
- catalog issued "c1991.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press,".
- catalog subject "658.4/0353 20".
- catalog subject "Economics, Mathematical.".
- catalog subject "Game theory.".
- catalog subject "HB144 .F83 1991".
- catalog tableOfContents "I. Static games of complete information -- 1. Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium -- 2. Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium -- II. Dynamic games of complete information -- 3. Extensive-form games -- 4. Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions -- 5. Repeated games -- III. Static games of incomplete information -- 6. Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium -- 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design -- IV. Dynamic games of incomplete information -- 8. Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection -- 9. Reputation effects -- 10. Sequential bargining under incomplete information -- V. Advanced topics -- 11. More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, in iterated weak dominance -- 12. Advanced topics in strategic-form games -- 13. Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium -- 14. Common knowledge and games -- Index.".
- catalog title "Game theory / Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole.".
- catalog type "text".