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• catalog abstract "Indian Expeditionary Force D landed at the head of the Persian Gulf on 7 November 1914 and quickly gained control of the area around Basra. Since the British army was already involved in drawn-out trench warfare in France, and the outlook there was far from bright, it seemed odd that the British government would commit troops to another campaign. The traditionally accepted rationale behind this move has been the protection of oil supplies used by the Royal Navy - but the campaign veered seriously away from its original intent. What followed was perhaps the finest example of blind political ambition in wartime. In April 1915, another division was added to Force D; and its new commander, General Sir John Nixon, arrived in Mesopotamia with orders to protect the oil supply, establish British control in the province of Basra, and prepare plans for a possible future offensive on Baghdad. The campaign against the Turks was a model of daring and sacrifice in the Middle Eastern desert. Successive victories encouraged the authorities in India to expand the campaign to aim at Baghdad. At this point the campaign was doomed to failure. The lack of direction, policy, and cooperation between Nixon, India, and London resulted in the total lack of a suitable logistic framework in Mesopotamia. An unwitting conspiracy of hesitant and uninformed leaders in London, greedy politicians in India, and aggressive "men on the spot" brought about the longest siege in British history and one of the great military disasters of this century. The appalling suffering and loss of the 6th Indian Division provoked such a public outcry in Britain that the government was obliged to institute a parliamentary investigation. The resulting Mesopotamia Commission rocked the nation and the government alike. This book probes the rationale behind the British interest in the Middle East, the invasion of Mesopotamia, the successes that drove the political aspirations higher, and the brilliance of the leadership and soldiery in contrast to the blindness of zealous politicians. It gives the most in-depth analysis of the Mesopotamia Commission anywhere and apportions blame where it is due and forgiveness where it is necessary. It is a story of soldiers at their best who were sacrificed for politics at its worst.".
• catalog contributor b4920228.
• catalog created "c1994.".
• catalog date "1994".
• catalog date "c1994.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "c1994.".
• catalog description "1. Background -- Constantinople -- 2. Background -- Mesopotamia -- 3. Opening Moves -- 4. Consolidation of the Basra Vilayet -- 5. The de Bunsen Committee and the Sykes-Picot Agreement -- 6. The Decision to Advance to Baghdad -- 7. The Siege of Kut Al Amara -- 8. The Mesopotamian Commission -- 9. The Commission's Report.".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 266-270) and index.".
• catalog description "Indian Expeditionary Force D landed at the head of the Persian Gulf on 7 November 1914 and quickly gained control of the area around Basra. Since the British army was already involved in drawn-out trench warfare in France, and the outlook there was far from bright, it seemed odd that the British government would commit troops to another campaign. The traditionally accepted rationale behind this move has been the protection of oil supplies used by the Royal Navy - but the campaign veered seriously away from its original intent. What followed was perhaps the finest example of blind political ambition in wartime. In April 1915, another division was added to Force D; and its new commander, General Sir John Nixon, arrived in Mesopotamia with orders to protect the oil supply, establish British control in the province of Basra, and prepare plans for a possible future offensive on Baghdad. The campaign against the Turks was a model of daring and sacrifice in the Middle Eastern desert. ".
• catalog description "Successive victories encouraged the authorities in India to expand the campaign to aim at Baghdad. At this point the campaign was doomed to failure. The lack of direction, policy, and cooperation between Nixon, India, and London resulted in the total lack of a suitable logistic framework in Mesopotamia. An unwitting conspiracy of hesitant and uninformed leaders in London, greedy politicians in India, and aggressive "men on the spot" brought about the longest siege in British history and one of the great military disasters of this century. The appalling suffering and loss of the 6th Indian Division provoked such a public outcry in Britain that the government was obliged to institute a parliamentary investigation. The resulting Mesopotamia Commission rocked the nation and the government alike. ".
• catalog description "This book probes the rationale behind the British interest in the Middle East, the invasion of Mesopotamia, the successes that drove the political aspirations higher, and the brilliance of the leadership and soldiery in contrast to the blindness of zealous politicians. It gives the most in-depth analysis of the Mesopotamia Commission anywhere and apportions blame where it is due and forgiveness where it is necessary. It is a story of soldiers at their best who were sacrificed for politics at its worst.".
• catalog extent "279 p. :".
• catalog hasFormat "Ends and means.".
• catalog identifier "083863530X (alk. paper)".
• catalog isFormatOf "Ends and means.".
• catalog issued "1994".
• catalog issued "c1994.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "Rutherford, N.J. : Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ; London ; Cranbury, NJ : Associated University Presses,".
• catalog relation "Ends and means.".
• catalog spatial "Iraq.".
• catalog subject "940.4/15 20".
• catalog subject "D568.5 .D38 1994".
• catalog subject "World War, 1914-1918 Campaigns Iraq.".
• catalog tableOfContents "1. Background -- Constantinople -- 2. Background -- Mesopotamia -- 3. Opening Moves -- 4. Consolidation of the Basra Vilayet -- 5. The de Bunsen Committee and the Sykes-Picot Agreement -- 6. The Decision to Advance to Baghdad -- 7. The Siege of Kut Al Amara -- 8. The Mesopotamian Commission -- 9. The Commission's Report.".
• catalog title "Ends and means : the British Mesopotamian campaign and commission / Paul K. Davis.".
• catalog type "text".