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- catalog abstract "In Mental Reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings-on in the brain constitute -- literally are -- conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them.".
- catalog contributor b6539313.
- catalog created "c1994.".
- catalog date "1994".
- catalog date "c1994.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c1994.".
- catalog description "In Mental Reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings-on in the brain constitute -- literally are -- conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. [325]-330) and index.".
- catalog description "Three questions --- Agnostic materialism --- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism --- 'Mental' -- Natural intentionality --- Pain and 'pain' --- The weather watchers --- Behavior --- The concept of mind.".
- catalog extent "xiv, 337 p. ;".
- catalog identifier "0262193523".
- catalog isPartOf "Representation and mind".
- catalog issued "1994".
- catalog issued "c1994.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press,".
- catalog subject "128/.2 20".
- catalog subject "B808.9 .S73 1994".
- catalog subject "Behaviorism (Psychology)".
- catalog subject "Consciousness.".
- catalog subject "Materialism.".
- catalog subject "Mind and body.".
- catalog subject "Philosophy of mind.".
- catalog tableOfContents "Three questions --- Agnostic materialism --- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism --- 'Mental' -- Natural intentionality --- Pain and 'pain' --- The weather watchers --- Behavior --- The concept of mind.".
- catalog title "Mental reality / Galen Strawson.".
- catalog type "text".