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- catalog abstract "In this provocative manifesto, Donald A. Wittman refutes one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government. Applying economic analysis to virtually every aspect of politics, Wittman confronts the stock examples of democratic market failure, from self-aggrandizing or incompetent bureaucracies and inefficient regulations to powerful pressure groups and uninformed voters. He argues that democratic governments and democratic markets are no more inefficient than the economic markets to which they are so often unfavorably compared. Wittman concludes that political institutions are organized to promote wealth-maximizing outcomes, are highly competitive, and are able to reward political and bureaucratic entrepreneurs for efficient behavior. He demonstrates that nearly all of the arguments claiming that economic markets are efficient apply equally well to democratic political markets; and, conversely, that economic models of political failure are not more valid than the analogous arguments for economic market failure.".
- catalog contributor b7440796.
- catalog created "1995.".
- catalog date "1995".
- catalog date "1995.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "1995.".
- catalog description "1. Introduction: The Market Metaphor -- 2. The Informed Voter -- 3. Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior -- 4. Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions -- 5. Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology Does Not Explain Democratic Politics -- 6. Legislative Markets and Organization -- 7. Pressure Groups -- 8. Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and Not Too Large -- 9. The Market for Regulation -- 10. The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role of Transaction Costs in Constitutional Design -- 11. Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation -- 12. The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power -- 13. The Testing of Theory -- 14. Epilogue: The Burden of Proof.".
- catalog description "In this provocative manifesto, Donald A. Wittman refutes one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government. Applying economic analysis to virtually every aspect of politics, Wittman confronts the stock examples of democratic market failure, from self-aggrandizing or incompetent bureaucracies and inefficient regulations to powerful pressure groups and uninformed voters. He argues that democratic governments and democratic markets are no more inefficient than the economic markets to which they are so often unfavorably compared. Wittman concludes that political institutions are organized to promote wealth-maximizing outcomes, are highly competitive, and are able to reward political and bureaucratic entrepreneurs for efficient behavior. He demonstrates that nearly all of the arguments claiming that economic markets are efficient apply equally well to democratic political markets; and, conversely, that economic models of political failure are not more valid than the analogous arguments for economic market failure.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p.195-215) and indexes.".
- catalog extent "ix, 229 p. :".
- catalog identifier "0226904229 (alk. paper)".
- catalog isPartOf "American politics and political economy".
- catalog issued "1995".
- catalog issued "1995.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Chicago : University of Chicago Press,".
- catalog subject "321.8 20".
- catalog subject "Democracy.".
- catalog subject "Free enterprise.".
- catalog subject "JC423 .W499 1995".
- catalog tableOfContents "1. Introduction: The Market Metaphor -- 2. The Informed Voter -- 3. Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior -- 4. Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions -- 5. Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology Does Not Explain Democratic Politics -- 6. Legislative Markets and Organization -- 7. Pressure Groups -- 8. Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and Not Too Large -- 9. The Market for Regulation -- 10. The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role of Transaction Costs in Constitutional Design -- 11. Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation -- 12. The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power -- 13. The Testing of Theory -- 14. Epilogue: The Burden of Proof.".
- catalog title "The myth of democratic failure : why political institutions are efficient / Donald A. Wittman.".
- catalog type "text".