Matches in Harvard for { <http://id.lib.harvard.edu/aleph/005341520/catalog> ?p ?o. }
Showing items 1 to 28 of
28
with 100 items per page.
- catalog abstract "This report addresses the question of deterring nuclear attacks by regional adversaries against the United States, U.S. forces overseas, or U.S. allies. Because emerging nuclear states will have small arsenals at first, regional nuclear threats will be made primarily for three political purposes, to: (1) deter the U.S. from intervening in a regional conflict, (2) intimidate U.S. regional allies; and/or (3) ensure the survival of their state or regime. Effective U.S. deterrent strategies vary depending on the purpose behind the nuclear threat. A U.S. strategy of "escalation dominance" should credibly deter nuclear threats against the U.S. homeland or U.S. forces overseas when the adversary's objective is to prevent U.S. intervention. A U.S. strategy of extended deterrence based on escalation dominance, backed up by theater defenses, should prevent U.S. regional allies from being intimidated by an adversary's nuclear threats. For the third threat, which is the most difficult to deter, U.S. strategy should shift away from retaliatory deterrence to highly effective damage limitation (i.e., counterforce capabilities backed up by effective defenses).".
- catalog contributor b7539010.
- catalog contributor b7539011.
- catalog contributor b7539012.
- catalog contributor b7539013.
- catalog contributor b7539014.
- catalog contributor b7539015.
- catalog contributor b7539016.
- catalog coverage "United States Military policy.".
- catalog created "1995.".
- catalog date "1995".
- catalog date "1995.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "1995.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-75).".
- catalog description "This report addresses the question of deterring nuclear attacks by regional adversaries against the United States, U.S. forces overseas, or U.S. allies. Because emerging nuclear states will have small arsenals at first, regional nuclear threats will be made primarily for three political purposes, to: (1) deter the U.S. from intervening in a regional conflict, (2) intimidate U.S. regional allies; and/or (3) ensure the survival of their state or regime. Effective U.S. deterrent strategies vary depending on the purpose behind the nuclear threat. A U.S. strategy of "escalation dominance" should credibly deter nuclear threats against the U.S. homeland or U.S. forces overseas when the adversary's objective is to prevent U.S. intervention. A U.S. strategy of extended deterrence based on escalation dominance, backed up by theater defenses, should prevent U.S. regional allies from being intimidated by an adversary's nuclear threats. For the third threat, which is the most difficult to deter, U.S. strategy should shift away from retaliatory deterrence to highly effective damage limitation (i.e., counterforce capabilities backed up by effective defenses).".
- catalog extent "xv, 75 p. :".
- catalog identifier "0833015966".
- catalog issued "1995".
- catalog issued "1995.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Santa Monica, CA : Rand,".
- catalog spatial "United States Military policy.".
- catalog subject "355.02/17 20".
- catalog subject "Deterrence (Strategy)".
- catalog subject "Nuclear nonproliferation.".
- catalog subject "UA23 .W4582 1994".
- catalog title "Nuclear deterrence in a regional context / Dean Wilkening, Kenneth Watman.".
- catalog type "text".