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- catalog abstract "This paper begins with the empirical observation that senior executives feel that line managers and workers tend to specialize less thatn the desired extent, whereas staff employees and experts tend to overspecialize. The paper identifies thhe significant differences beween linfe workers ad experts, which lead to their establishing different employment relationships with the firm. If the employees' skills are not verifiable by their manager, then skill choices become susceptible to moral hazard: line workers underspecilaize and experts overspecilaize, compared to what theiir manager desires. This result is show robust to changes in model specifications. Whereas a competitive yardstick incentive scheme exacerbates non-optimal specilaization, a team-oriented compensation schheme alleviates the problem. Asymmetries among workers also skew thespecilaization choice. The paper provides evidence for these propositions from longitudinal case studies of four companies [Intel Corp., Corning, Inc., Tata group, Richardson Sheffield].".
- catalog contributor b7989353.
- catalog created "1993.".
- catalog date "1993".
- catalog date "1993.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "1993.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-60).".
- catalog description "This paper begins with the empirical observation that senior executives feel that line managers and workers tend to specialize less thatn the desired extent, whereas staff employees and experts tend to overspecialize. The paper identifies thhe significant differences beween linfe workers ad experts, which lead to their establishing different employment relationships with the firm. If the employees' skills are not verifiable by their manager, then skill choices become susceptible to moral hazard: line workers underspecilaize and experts overspecilaize, compared to what theiir manager desires. This result is show robust to changes in model specifications. Whereas a competitive yardstick incentive scheme exacerbates non-optimal specilaization, a team-oriented compensation schheme alleviates the problem. Asymmetries among workers also skew thespecilaization choice. The paper provides evidence for these propositions from longitudinal case studies of four companies [Intel Corp., Corning, Inc., Tata group, Richardson Sheffield].".
- catalog extent "60 p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research) ; HBS 94-037.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 94-037".
- catalog issued "1993".
- catalog issued "1993.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog subject "Corning Incorporated.".
- catalog subject "Human capital Management Case studies.".
- catalog subject "Human capital Management Mathematical models.".
- catalog subject "Intel Corporation.".
- catalog subject "Richardson Sheffield Ltd.".
- catalog subject "Tata Locomotive and Engineering Company, Ltd.".
- catalog title "Specialization within a firm / by Ashish Nanda.".
- catalog type "text".