Data Portal @ linkeddatafragments.org

Matches in Harvard for { <http://id.lib.harvard.edu/aleph/005740237/catalog> ?p ?o. }

• catalog abstract "Regulatory Takings argues that the issue is not so much about the details of property law as it is about the fairness of politics and the capacity of the courts to protect property interests. William Fischel demonstrates that property is often protected by nonjudicial means. Local governments are deterred from unfairly regulating portable assets by their owners' threat of "exit" from the jurisdiction. State and federal government regulations are disciplined by property-owner coalitions whose "voice" is clearly audible in the statehouses and in Congress. Constitutional courts need to preserve their resources for use in areas in which politics is loaded against the property owner. Zoning and rent controls, which often promote the interests of a majority of local residents at the expense of unrepresented outsiders, require closer judicial scrutiny than national laws such as the Endangered Species Act. Regulatory Takings advances an economic standard to decide when a local regulation crosses the line from legitimate police power to a taking that requires just compensation for owners who are adversely affected. Regulatory Takings goes beyond case law and jurisprudential theories to buttress its arguments. It employs economic and political analysis, historical investigations, and statistical studies to make a case for judicial federalism.".
• catalog contributor b8076250.
• catalog created "1995.".
• catalog date "1995".
• catalog date "1995.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "1995.".
• catalog description "1. Of Coase and Coal: Regulatory Takings in the U.S. Supreme Court -- 2. Eminent Domain's Democratic Origins and Economic Cycles -- 3. Constitutional Law, Process Theory, and Democratic Commitment -- 4. The Economic-Utilitarian Theories of Michelman and Epstein -- 5. Rational Expectations and Contractarian Conventions -- 6. Capitalizing on Land Use Regulation: Evidence from California -- 7. Zoning, Capitalization, and the Efficiency of Local Government -- 8. How Exit and Voice Discipline Governmental Excess -- 9. Remedies for Unfair Land Use Restrictions and Exactions.".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 377-406) and index.".
• catalog description "Regulatory Takings argues that the issue is not so much about the details of property law as it is about the fairness of politics and the capacity of the courts to protect property interests. William Fischel demonstrates that property is often protected by nonjudicial means. Local governments are deterred from unfairly regulating portable assets by their owners' threat of "exit" from the jurisdiction. State and federal government regulations are disciplined by property-owner coalitions whose "voice" is clearly audible in the statehouses and in Congress. Constitutional courts need to preserve their resources for use in areas in which politics is loaded against the property owner. Zoning and rent controls, which often promote the interests of a majority of local residents at the expense of unrepresented outsiders, require closer judicial scrutiny than national laws such as the Endangered Species Act. Regulatory Takings advances an economic standard to decide when a local regulation crosses the line from legitimate police power to a taking that requires just compensation for owners who are adversely affected. Regulatory Takings goes beyond case law and jurisprudential theories to buttress its arguments. It employs economic and political analysis, historical investigations, and statistical studies to make a case for judicial federalism.".
• catalog extent "xi, 415 p. ;".
• catalog hasFormat "Regulatory takings.".
• catalog identifier "0674753887 (acid-free paper)".
• catalog isFormatOf "Regulatory takings.".
• catalog issued "1995".
• catalog issued "1995.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press,".
• catalog relation "Regulatory takings.".
• catalog spatial "California.".
• catalog spatial "United States.".
• catalog subject "343.73/0252 347.303252 20".
• catalog subject "Eminent domain California.".
• catalog subject "Eminent domain Economic aspects United States.".
• catalog subject "KF5698 .F573 1995".
• catalog subject "Land use Law and legislation California.".
• catalog subject "Land use Law and legislation United States.".
• catalog subject "Police power Economic aspects United States.".
• catalog subject "Right of property United States.".
• catalog tableOfContents "1. Of Coase and Coal: Regulatory Takings in the U.S. Supreme Court -- 2. Eminent Domain's Democratic Origins and Economic Cycles -- 3. Constitutional Law, Process Theory, and Democratic Commitment -- 4. The Economic-Utilitarian Theories of Michelman and Epstein -- 5. Rational Expectations and Contractarian Conventions -- 6. Capitalizing on Land Use Regulation: Evidence from California -- 7. Zoning, Capitalization, and the Efficiency of Local Government -- 8. How Exit and Voice Discipline Governmental Excess -- 9. Remedies for Unfair Land Use Restrictions and Exactions.".
• catalog title "Regulatory takings : law, economics, and politics / William A. Fischel.".
• catalog type "text".