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- catalog abstract "Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance. Liberman's argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany's capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France's seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89. Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international systems is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman's findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action.".
- catalog contributor b8194266.
- catalog created "c1996.".
- catalog date "1996".
- catalog date "c1996.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c1996.".
- catalog description "Does Conquest Pay? demonstrates that expansion can, in fact, provide rewards to aggressor nations. Peter Liberman argues that invaders can exploit industrial societies for short periods of time and can maintain control and economic performance over the long term. This is because modern societies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion and repression. Hence, by wielding a gun in one hand and offering food with the other, determined conquerors can compel collaboration and suppress resistance. Liberman's argument is supported by several historical case studies: Germany's capture of Belgium and Luxembourg during World War I and of nearly all of Europe during World War II; France's seizure of the Ruhr in 1923-24; the Japanese Empire during 1910-45; and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1945-89.".
- catalog description "Does Conquest Pay? suggests that the international systems is more war-prone than many optimists claim. Liberman's findings also contribute to debates about the stability of empires and other authoritarian regimes, the effectiveness of national resistance strategies, and the sources of rebellious collective action.".
- catalog description "Does conquest pay? -- When does conquest pay? -- Nazi-occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944 -- Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918 -- The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924 -- The Japanese Empire, 1910-1945 -- The Soviet Empire, 1945-1989 -- The spoils of conquest.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. [209]-242) and index.".
- catalog extent "xi, 250 p. :".
- catalog identifier "0691029865 (cl : alk. paper)".
- catalog isPartOf "Princeton studies in international history and politics".
- catalog issued "1996".
- catalog issued "c1996.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press,".
- catalog subject "325/.32/0904 20".
- catalog subject "JX5003 .L53 1996".
- catalog subject "Military occupation Economic aspects Case studies.".
- catalog subject "Military occupation Economic aspects.".
- catalog tableOfContents "Does conquest pay? -- When does conquest pay? -- Nazi-occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944 -- Belgium and Luxembourg, 1914-1918 -- The Ruhr-Rhineland, 1923-1924 -- The Japanese Empire, 1910-1945 -- The Soviet Empire, 1945-1989 -- The spoils of conquest.".
- catalog title "Does conquest pay? : the exploitation of occupied industrial societies / Peter Liberman.".
- catalog type "Case studies. fast".
- catalog type "text".