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- catalog abstract "Annotation First established as a cabinet system in Guangzhou in 1925, the Nationalist Government of China was replaced three years later by a presidential system under a unified Nationalist government in Nanjing. The cabinet government was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was again installed by the 1936 constitution. Why did presidential and cabinet systems exist alternately during this formative period of the Nationalist government? Why was the presidential system finally adopted in 1936? Suisheng Zhao answers these and other questions fundamental to understanding authoritarian regimes in this pioneering study of the design of the Nationalist Government of China from 1925 to 1937. Borrowing ideas from public choice theory, Zhao proposes that political actors who design governmental institutions are driven by power-maximization strategies just as business firms are driven by wealth-maximization strategies. Constitution-making reflects the underlying distribution of power among authoritarian leaders, who attempt to design political institutions that will consolidate their personal power and position. Thus, Zhao argues, if political actors possess more power resources than their rivals and anticipate themselves becoming dominant, they will choose the singular leadership of the presidential system. If they are in a weaker position and do not anticipate becoming dominant, they will prefer the collective leadership of the cabinet form of government.".
- catalog alternative "Project Muse UPCC books net".
- catalog contributor b9055768.
- catalog coverage "Taiwan Politics and government 1895-1945.".
- catalog created "c1996.".
- catalog date "1996".
- catalog date "c1996.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c1996.".
- catalog description "1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings -- 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism -- 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships -- 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players -- 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players -- 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925-1928 -- 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928-1931 -- 8. The Destruction of Chiang's Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidential Government, 1931-1937 -- 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective.".
- catalog description "Annotation First established as a cabinet system in Guangzhou in 1925, the Nationalist Government of China was replaced three years later by a presidential system under a unified Nationalist government in Nanjing. The cabinet government was restored in 1931 and existed until the presidential system was again installed by the 1936 constitution. Why did presidential and cabinet systems exist alternately during this formative period of the Nationalist government? Why was the presidential system finally adopted in 1936? Suisheng Zhao answers these and other questions fundamental to understanding authoritarian regimes in this pioneering study of the design of the Nationalist Government of China from 1925 to 1937. Borrowing ideas from public choice theory, Zhao proposes that political actors who design governmental institutions are driven by power-maximization strategies just as business firms are driven by wealth-maximization strategies. Constitution-making reflects the underlying distribution of power among authoritarian leaders, who attempt to design political institutions that will consolidate their personal power and position. Thus, Zhao argues, if political actors possess more power resources than their rivals and anticipate themselves becoming dominant, they will choose the singular leadership of the presidential system. If they are in a weaker position and do not anticipate becoming dominant, they will prefer the collective leadership of the cabinet form of government.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references and index.".
- catalog extent "xii, 217 p. ;".
- catalog hasFormat "Power by design.".
- catalog identifier "0824817214 (alk. paper)".
- catalog isFormatOf "Power by design.".
- catalog issued "1996".
- catalog issued "c1996.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press,".
- catalog relation "Power by design.".
- catalog spatial "Taiwan Politics and government 1895-1945.".
- catalog spatial "Taiwan.".
- catalog subject "320.951/09/041 20".
- catalog subject "Constitutional history Taiwan.".
- catalog subject "JQ1522 .Z43 1996".
- catalog tableOfContents "1. Introduction: Institutional Design in Authoritarian Settings -- 2. The Rise of Constitutionalism -- 3. Power Resources and Authority Relationships -- 4. Relative Power Positions of the Major Players -- 5. Institutional Preferences of the Major Players -- 6. The Succession Struggle: From Cabinet to Presidential Government, 1925-1928 -- 7. The Grand Anti-Chiang Coalition: From Presidential to Cabinet Government, 1928-1931 -- 8. The Destruction of Chiang's Major Rivals: From Cabinet Back to Presidential Government, 1931-1937 -- 9. Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective.".
- catalog title "Power by design : constitution-making in Nationalist China / Suisheng Zhao.".
- catalog type "text".