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- catalog abstract "This paper proposes that the services performed by banks can be distinguished along two functional dimensions: (1) the degree of information asymmetry resolved in providing the service, and (2) the degree of verifiability of the value of the service rendered. The authors develop a framework--in which the equilibrium outcome is long-term contracting when information is specific, and short-term when it is non-specific, to the service--that demonstrates that costly overspecialization occurs in certain deal-type transactions and underspecialization occurs in lending-type transactions. They propose an explanation for phenomena such as bank syndication, and show that first-mover advantages and monopoly skills are natural outcomes of the model. Their analysis has implications for banking regulation such as the Glass-Steagall Act.".
- catalog contributor b9488937.
- catalog contributor b9488938.
- catalog created "1996.".
- catalog date "1996".
- catalog date "1996.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "1996.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 42).".
- catalog description "This paper proposes that the services performed by banks can be distinguished along two functional dimensions: (1) the degree of information asymmetry resolved in providing the service, and (2) the degree of verifiability of the value of the service rendered. The authors develop a framework--in which the equilibrium outcome is long-term contracting when information is specific, and short-term when it is non-specific, to the service--that demonstrates that costly overspecialization occurs in certain deal-type transactions and underspecialization occurs in lending-type transactions. They propose an explanation for phenomena such as bank syndication, and show that first-mover advantages and monopoly skills are natural outcomes of the model. Their analysis has implications for banking regulation such as the Glass-Steagall Act.".
- catalog extent "42 p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research) ; HBS 96-061.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 96-061".
- catalog issued "1996".
- catalog issued "1996.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog title "A theory of banking structure / Snajiv R. Das & Ashish Nanda.".
- catalog type "text".