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- catalog abstract "This study provides new evidence on privatization and contracting in government-owned enterprises. We find that under pressure to preserve jobs, Germany's privatization practices evolved from a quick sale approach to one of increasing subsidization and intervention. An unusual organization, the Management KG, was "invented" by Germany's Privatization Agency to stem the pressure to stop privatization. Described briefly, KGs are organizations created to provide private-sector management to a portfolio of eight to ten eastern German firms. The government-owned privatization agency owns the firms and provides funding, and so serves as a kind of venture capitalist. Our analysis of the Management KG examines the opportunities and limitations of contracting with a government owner. We argue that government owners are inherently less reliable contracting partners than private firms. Therefore, when government organizations choose to engage in contract-based activities, they are forced into more costly and detailed explicit contracts than those used by private firms. The structure of the KG contract is consistent with this prediction.".
- catalog contributor b9856648.
- catalog contributor b9856649.
- catalog created "1996.".
- catalog date "1996".
- catalog date "1996.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "1996.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (leaves 32-34).".
- catalog description "This study provides new evidence on privatization and contracting in government-owned enterprises. We find that under pressure to preserve jobs, Germany's privatization practices evolved from a quick sale approach to one of increasing subsidization and intervention. An unusual organization, the Management KG, was "invented" by Germany's Privatization Agency to stem the pressure to stop privatization. Described briefly, KGs are organizations created to provide private-sector management to a portfolio of eight to ten eastern German firms. The government-owned privatization agency owns the firms and provides funding, and so serves as a kind of venture capitalist. Our analysis of the Management KG examines the opportunities and limitations of contracting with a government owner. We argue that government owners are inherently less reliable contracting partners than private firms. Therefore, when government organizations choose to engage in contract-based activities, they are forced into more costly and detailed explicit contracts than those used by private firms. The structure of the KG contract is consistent with this prediction.".
- catalog extent "34, [5] leaves :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research) ; HBS 97-007.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 97-007".
- catalog issued "1996".
- catalog issued "1996.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog title "The government as venture capitalist? : organizational solutions to contracting problems in German privatization / by I.J. Alexander Dyck and Karen H. Wruck.".
- catalog type "text".