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• catalog abstract "In this book J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber address deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy, without any offsetting payment of compensation, the value of private property in network industries. They term such policies "deregulatory takings." They further analyze the problem of the state's abrogation of its "regulatory contract" with private firms. They argue that constitutional projections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for breach of contract, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of network industries. Sidak and Spulber then derive the efficient price for the incumbent regulated firm to charge when the government compels it to sell access to its network to competitors. That price is the same price that emerges from application of takings jurisprudence and contract principles. Sidak and Spulber produce a comprehensive, coherent theory of "stranded costs," as well as a set of limiting principles for the payment of compensation when changes in government regulation upset settled expectations and harm private investors. Sidak and Spulber reaffirm the superiority of competition over regulation and, on the basis of their conclusions concerning efficient and compensatory pricing of network access, outline principles for deregulating network industries. This book makes basic theoretical contributions to both law and economics and has immediate relevance to policymakers involved in the competitive restructuring of the telecommunications and electric power industries in the United States and other countries.".
• catalog contributor b10672534.
• catalog contributor b10672535.
• catalog created "1997.".
• catalog date "1997".
• catalog date "1997.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "1997.".
• catalog description "1. The Nature of the Controversy -- 2. Deregulation and Network Pricing -- 3. Quarantines and Quagmires -- 4. The Regulatory Contract -- 5. Remedies for Breach of the Regulatory Contract -- 6. Takings and the Property of the Regulated Utility -- 7. Just Compensation for Deregulatory Takings -- 8. The Efficient Component-Pricing Rule -- 9. The Market-Determined Efficient Component-Pricing Rule -- 10. Answering the Critics of Efficient Component Pricing -- 11. The Equivalence Principle -- 12. TSLRIC Pricing and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs -- 13. Deregulatory Takings and Efficient Capital Markets -- 14. Limiting Principles for Stranded Cost Recovery -- 15. Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries.".
• catalog description "In this book J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber address deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy, without any offsetting payment of compensation, the value of private property in network industries. They term such policies "deregulatory takings." They further analyze the problem of the state's abrogation of its "regulatory contract" with private firms. They argue that constitutional projections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for breach of contract, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of network industries. Sidak and Spulber then derive the efficient price for the incumbent regulated firm to charge when the government compels it to sell access to its network to competitors.".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. [567]-589) and indexes.".
• catalog description "That price is the same price that emerges from application of takings jurisprudence and contract principles. Sidak and Spulber produce a comprehensive, coherent theory of "stranded costs," as well as a set of limiting principles for the payment of compensation when changes in government regulation upset settled expectations and harm private investors. Sidak and Spulber reaffirm the superiority of competition over regulation and, on the basis of their conclusions concerning efficient and compensatory pricing of network access, outline principles for deregulating network industries.".
• catalog description "This book makes basic theoretical contributions to both law and economics and has immediate relevance to policymakers involved in the competitive restructuring of the telecommunications and electric power industries in the United States and other countries.".
• catalog extent "xx, 631 p. ;".
• catalog identifier "0521591597 (alk. paper)".
• catalog issued "1997".
• catalog issued "1997.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press,".
• catalog spatial "United States.".
• catalog subject "384/.041 21".
• catalog subject "Breach of contract United States.".
• catalog subject "Electric utilities Deregulation United States.".
• catalog subject "Electric utilities Law and legislation United States.".
• catalog subject "HE7781 .S56 1997".
• catalog subject "Public utilities Deregulation United States.".
• catalog subject "Public utilities Law and legislation United States.".
• catalog subject "Right of property United States.".
• catalog subject "Telecommunication Deregulation United States.".
• catalog subject "Telecommunication Law and legislation United States.".
• catalog tableOfContents "1. The Nature of the Controversy -- 2. Deregulation and Network Pricing -- 3. Quarantines and Quagmires -- 4. The Regulatory Contract -- 5. Remedies for Breach of the Regulatory Contract -- 6. Takings and the Property of the Regulated Utility -- 7. Just Compensation for Deregulatory Takings -- 8. The Efficient Component-Pricing Rule -- 9. The Market-Determined Efficient Component-Pricing Rule -- 10. Answering the Critics of Efficient Component Pricing -- 11. The Equivalence Principle -- 12. TSLRIC Pricing and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs -- 13. Deregulatory Takings and Efficient Capital Markets -- 14. Limiting Principles for Stranded Cost Recovery -- 15. Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries.".
• catalog title "Deregulatory takings and the regulatory contract : the competitive transformation of network industries in the United States / J. Gregory Sidak, Daniel F. Spulber.".
• catalog type "text".