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- catalog abstract "This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1) are uninformed about individuals value of time in both market and non-market activities observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, and (3) are utilitarian. Formally, the problem is a special case of a multidimensional screening problem with two dimensions of unobserved attributes. In contrast to much of the optimal income taxation literature, we show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves distorting market employment upwards for low net-income individuals (through negative marginal income taxes or employment subsidies) and distorting employment downward for high net-income individuals (through positive marginal income taxes). It is also shown that workfare is only part of an optimal program if certain individuals have not access to market employment.".
- catalog contributor b10674778.
- catalog contributor b10674779.
- catalog contributor b10674780.
- catalog created "c1998.".
- catalog date "1998".
- catalog date "c1998.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c1998.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-40).".
- catalog description "This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1) are uninformed about individuals value of time in both market and non-market activities observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, and (3) are utilitarian. Formally, the problem is a special case of a multidimensional screening problem with two dimensions of unobserved attributes. In contrast to much of the optimal income taxation literature, we show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves distorting market employment upwards for low net-income individuals (through negative marginal income taxes or employment subsidies) and distorting employment downward for high net-income individuals (through positive marginal income taxes). It is also shown that workfare is only part of an optimal program if certain individuals have not access to market employment.".
- catalog extent "49 p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "NBER working paper series ; working paper 6355".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; working paper no. 6355.".
- catalog issued "1998".
- catalog issued "c1998.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research,".
- catalog title "Taxes and employment subsidies in optimal redistribution programs / Paul Beaudry, Charles Blackorby.".
- catalog type "Computer network resources. local".
- catalog type "text".