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- catalog abstract "This paper examines the influence of institutional investors on the incentives of corporate managers to alter long-term investment for earnings management purposes. Many critics argue that the short-term focus of institutional investors encourages managers to sacrifice long-term investment to meet current earnings targets. Others argue that the large stockholdings and sophistication of institutions allow them to fulfill a monitoring role in preventing such myopicinvestment behavior. I examine these competing views by testing whether institutional ownership affects R&D spending for firms that could reverse a decline in earnings with a reduction in R&D. The results indicate that managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline when institutional ownership is high, implying that institutions typically serve a monitoring role relative to individual investors. However, I find that a high proportion of ownership by institutions exhibiting "transient" ownership behavior (i.e., high portfolio turnover and momentum trading) significantly increases the probability that managers reduce R&D to boost earnings. These results indicate that high turnover and momentum trading by institutional investors can encourage myopic investment behavior when such institutional investors have extremely high levels of ownership in a firm; otherwise, institutional ownership serves to reduce pressures on managers for myopic investment behavior.".
- catalog contributor b10694730.
- catalog contributor b10694731.
- catalog created "c1998.".
- catalog date "1998".
- catalog date "c1998.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c1998.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-32).".
- catalog description "This paper examines the influence of institutional investors on the incentives of corporate managers to alter long-term investment for earnings management purposes. Many critics argue that the short-term focus of institutional investors encourages managers to sacrifice long-term investment to meet current earnings targets. Others argue that the large stockholdings and sophistication of institutions allow them to fulfill a monitoring role in preventing such myopicinvestment behavior. I examine these competing views by testing whether institutional ownership affects R&D spending for firms that could reverse a decline in earnings with a reduction in R&D. The results indicate that managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline when institutional ownership is high, implying that institutions typically serve a monitoring role relative to individual investors. However, I find that a high proportion of ownership by institutions exhibiting "transient" ownership behavior (i.e., high portfolio turnover and momentum trading) significantly increases the probability that managers reduce R&D to boost earnings. These results indicate that high turnover and momentum trading by institutional investors can encourage myopic investment behavior when such institutional investors have extremely high levels of ownership in a firm; otherwise, institutional ownership serves to reduce pressures on managers for myopic investment behavior.".
- catalog extent "40 p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research) ; 98-069.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 98-069".
- catalog issued "1998".
- catalog issued "c1998.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog title "Institutional investors, long-term investment, and earnings management / Brian Bushee.".
- catalog type "text".