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- catalog abstract ""This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence."--BOOK JACKET. "The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided."--BOOK JACKET. "This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy."--Jacket.".
- catalog contributor b11052398.
- catalog created "1999.".
- catalog date "1999".
- catalog date "1999.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "1999.".
- catalog description ""This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence."--BOOK JACKET. "The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided."--BOOK JACKET. "This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy."--Jacket.".
- catalog description "Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview -- Extensions of the Credibility Model -- Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control -- Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments -- Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias -- Policy Delegation and Elections -- Central Bank Independence and Targets -- On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets -- Central Bank Independence and Conservatism -- Some Evidence -- Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-156) and index.".
- catalog extent "viii, 162 p. :".
- catalog hasFormat "Central bank independence, targets, and credibility.".
- catalog identifier "1858989159".
- catalog isFormatOf "Central bank independence, targets, and credibility.".
- catalog issued "1999".
- catalog issued "1999.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, Ma. : Edward Elgar,".
- catalog relation "Central bank independence, targets, and credibility.".
- catalog spatial "European Union countries.".
- catalog subject "332.1/1 21".
- catalog subject "Banks and banking, Central European Union countries.".
- catalog subject "HG925 .L56 1999".
- catalog subject "Monetary policy European Union countries.".
- catalog tableOfContents "Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview -- Extensions of the Credibility Model -- Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control -- Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments -- Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias -- Policy Delegation and Elections -- Central Bank Independence and Targets -- On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets -- Central Bank Independence and Conservatism -- Some Evidence -- Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence.".
- catalog title "Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / Francesco Lippi.".
- catalog type "text".