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• catalog abstract "Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power--or any other military instrument--will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater.".
• catalog contributor b11379386.
• catalog contributor b11379387.
• catalog contributor b11379388.
• catalog contributor b11379389.
• catalog contributor b11379390.
• catalog created "1999.".
• catalog date "1999".
• catalog date "1999.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "1999.".
• catalog description "Ch. 1. Introduction -- Pt. 1. Definitions and Theory -- Ch. 2. How to Think about Coercion -- Pt. 2. Successful Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past -- Ch. 3. Explaining Success or Failure -- Pt. 3. Coercive Diplomacy Today -- Ch. 4. Domestic Constraints on Coercion -- Ch. 5. Coercion and Coalitions -- Ch. 6. Coercing Nonstate Actors: A Challenge -- Pt. 4. Coercion and the U.S. Air Force -- Ch. 7. Implications and Recommendations -- App. B. Cases and Conditions for Success -- App. C. Coercive Attempts and Common Challenges.".
• catalog description "Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the likelihood of successful coercion: (1) the coercer's ability to raise the costs it imposes while denying the adversary the chance to respond (escalation dominance); (2) an ability to block an adversary's military strategy for victory; and (3) an ability to magnify third-party threats, such as internal instability or the danger posed by another enemy. Domestic political concerns (such as casualty sensitivity) and coalition dynamics often constrain coercive operations and impair the achievement of these conditions. Air power can deliver potent and credible threats that foster the above factors while neutralizing adversary countercoercive moves. When the favorable factors are absent, however, air power--or any other military instrument--will probably fail to coerce. Policymakers' use of coercive air power under inauspicious conditions diminishes the chances of using it elsewhere when the prospects of success would be greater.".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 161-174).".
• catalog extent "xviii, 174 p. :".
• catalog identifier "0833027433".
• catalog issued "1999".
• catalog issued "1999.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "Santa Monica, CA : Rand,".
• catalog spatial "United States.".
• catalog subject "358.4/14/0973 21".
• catalog subject "Air power United States.".
• catalog subject "Air power.".
• catalog subject "Military planning United States.".
• catalog subject "UG633 .B94 1999".
• catalog tableOfContents "Ch. 1. Introduction -- Pt. 1. Definitions and Theory -- Ch. 2. How to Think about Coercion -- Pt. 2. Successful Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past -- Ch. 3. Explaining Success or Failure -- Pt. 3. Coercive Diplomacy Today -- Ch. 4. Domestic Constraints on Coercion -- Ch. 5. Coercion and Coalitions -- Ch. 6. Coercing Nonstate Actors: A Challenge -- Pt. 4. Coercion and the U.S. Air Force -- Ch. 7. Implications and Recommendations -- App. B. Cases and Conditions for Success -- App. C. Coercive Attempts and Common Challenges.".
• catalog title "Air power as a coercive instrument / Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, Eric Larson.".
• catalog type "text".