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- catalog abstract "Empirical evidence in this paper confronts the fundamental conjecture in the literature on state and private ownership that privatization enhances management incentives for financial performance. Using data from large firms in the United Kingdom, we find no relationship between pay and financial performance in state-owned firms, both before and after corporate governance reforms. In contrast, we find a strong sensitivity in privatized firms driven largely by stock options and shareholding. We measure an elasticity of changes in total compensation to market returns of 1.7 in privatized firms, implying a 62 percent increase in effective compensation for improving performce by one standard deviation above the mean. This sensitivity is significantly higher than in publicly-traded firms and is found in both the first four years and after four years as a privatized firm. We discuss the implications of these results for alternative theories of state and private ownership.".
- catalog contributor b11402654.
- catalog contributor b11402655.
- catalog contributor b11402656.
- catalog created "c1999.".
- catalog date "1999".
- catalog date "c1999.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c1999.".
- catalog description "Empirical evidence in this paper confronts the fundamental conjecture in the literature on state and private ownership that privatization enhances management incentives for financial performance. Using data from large firms in the United Kingdom, we find no relationship between pay and financial performance in state-owned firms, both before and after corporate governance reforms. In contrast, we find a strong sensitivity in privatized firms driven largely by stock options and shareholding. We measure an elasticity of changes in total compensation to market returns of 1.7 in privatized firms, implying a 62 percent increase in effective compensation for improving performce by one standard deviation above the mean. This sensitivity is significantly higher than in publicly-traded firms and is found in both the first four years and after four years as a privatized firm. We discuss the implications of these results for alternative theories of state and private ownership.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-41).".
- catalog extent "41, [12] p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research) ; 00-023.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 00-023".
- catalog issued "1999".
- catalog issued "c1999.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog title "Privatization, compensation and management incentives : evidence from the United Kingdom / I.J. Alexander Dyck [and Michael I. Cragg].".
- catalog type "text".