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- catalog abstract "We study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina during 1996-97. As in previous, informal accounts of corruption-crackdowns, there is a well defined, negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption. Prices paid by hospitals for basic inputs fall by 18% during the first six months of the crackdown. After this period prices rise, but they are still 10% lower than the pre-crackdown level. Input prices paid are uncorrelated with the wage premium received by the procurement officers of the hospitals when the audit intensity can be expected to be very low (prior to the crackdown) or very high (during the first months of the crackdown). After the initial six months, however, the effect of efficiency wages on prices is negative and well defined. The effects are economically significant: a 10% increase in the procurement officer₂s wage when the perceived probability of punishment is at the average of our sample is expected to bring about a 1.2% reduction in input prices. These results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of Becker and Stigler (1974). Using micro data helps avoid simultaneity problems.".
- catalog contributor b11742810.
- catalog contributor b11742811.
- catalog contributor b11742812.
- catalog created "c2000.".
- catalog date "2000".
- catalog date "c2000.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c2000.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31).".
- catalog description "We study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina during 1996-97. As in previous, informal accounts of corruption-crackdowns, there is a well defined, negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption. Prices paid by hospitals for basic inputs fall by 18% during the first six months of the crackdown. After this period prices rise, but they are still 10% lower than the pre-crackdown level. Input prices paid are uncorrelated with the wage premium received by the procurement officers of the hospitals when the audit intensity can be expected to be very low (prior to the crackdown) or very high (during the first months of the crackdown). After the initial six months, however, the effect of efficiency wages on prices is negative and well defined. The effects are economically significant: a 10% increase in the procurement officer₂s wage when the perceived probability of punishment is at the average of our sample is expected to bring about a 1.2% reduction in input prices. These results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of Becker and Stigler (1974). Using micro data helps avoid simultaneity problems.".
- catalog extent "31 p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research) ; 00-047.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 00-047".
- catalog issued "2000".
- catalog issued "c2000.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog title "The role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of Buenos Aires / Rafael Di Tella, Ernesto Schargrodsky.".
- catalog type "text".