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- catalog abstract "This paper studies the pricing of "private information", that is, information which is of value only (or mainly) for a specific consumer. In private information markets, firms are familiar with their client's decision problem and consumers purchase information sequentially from firms. As such, the utility for a second opinion depends on the content of the first opinion. This path-dependent nature of the demand has important implications for pricing because firms have to anticipate in which order will their products be considered/purchased. In particular, firms have the opportunity to specialize in selling first or second hand opinions only. Empirical evidence on pricing in a variety of private information markets shows that special "second opinion services" exist in some, but not all private information markets. In view of this evidence, the general question that the paper asks is: How should sellers of private information price their products? In particular, when can (will) they introducespecial second opinion services? The goal of the paper is (1) to shed some light on the empirical evidence on pricing in private information markets and (2) to help understand information sellers' incentives, thereby providing normative insights. Using an analytic model with two firms selling information to Bayesian customers, we show that under some conditions, firms engage in what we call "temporal differentiation".".
- catalog contributor b11802256.
- catalog contributor b11802257.
- catalog created "c2000.".
- catalog date "2000".
- catalog date "c2000.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c2000.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 31-32).".
- catalog description "This paper studies the pricing of "private information", that is, information which is of value only (or mainly) for a specific consumer. In private information markets, firms are familiar with their client's decision problem and consumers purchase information sequentially from firms. As such, the utility for a second opinion depends on the content of the first opinion. This path-dependent nature of the demand has important implications for pricing because firms have to anticipate in which order will their products be considered/purchased. In particular, firms have the opportunity to specialize in selling first or second hand opinions only. Empirical evidence on pricing in a variety of private information markets shows that special "second opinion services" exist in some, but not all private information markets. In view of this evidence, the general question that the paper asks is: How should sellers of private information price their products? In particular, when can (will) they introducespecial second opinion services? The goal of the paper is (1) to shed some light on the empirical evidence on pricing in private information markets and (2) to help understand information sellers' incentives, thereby providing normative insights. Using an analytic model with two firms selling information to Bayesian customers, we show that under some conditions, firms engage in what we call "temporal differentiation".".
- catalog extent "33 p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research) ; 00-082.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 00-082".
- catalog issued "2000".
- catalog issued "c2000.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog title "Temporal differentiation and the market for second opinions / Miklos Sarvary.".
- catalog type "text".