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- catalog abstract "The nature of multilateral negotiations depends in part on bargainers' access to information. Information is routed through the communication links by which bargainers send messages to one another. We investigate how communication links affect a three-person coalition negotiation.We find that the available links strongly influence which coalition forms, and how payoffs within a coalition are distributed. The grand coalition formed more often when the weakest party controlled communication than when all bargainers could communicate freely. And while controlling communication can increase a bargainer's expected payoff, it need not do so. A non-cooperative extensive form model captures many of the regularities we observe even though bargainers in the experiment were not restricted to the extensive form game. We conjecture that process regularities in the data a propensity to make private offers and to bargain up to deadline approximate the strategic influence of sequential offer restriction and of time discounting.".
- catalog contributor b11900640.
- catalog contributor b11900641.
- catalog contributor b11900642.
- catalog contributor b11900643.
- catalog contributor b11900644.
- catalog created "c2000.".
- catalog date "2000".
- catalog date "c2000.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c2000.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references.".
- catalog description "The nature of multilateral negotiations depends in part on bargainers' access to information. Information is routed through the communication links by which bargainers send messages to one another. We investigate how communication links affect a three-person coalition negotiation.We find that the available links strongly influence which coalition forms, and how payoffs within a coalition are distributed. The grand coalition formed more often when the weakest party controlled communication than when all bargainers could communicate freely. And while controlling communication can increase a bargainer's expected payoff, it need not do so. A non-cooperative extensive form model captures many of the regularities we observe even though bargainers in the experiment were not restricted to the extensive form game. We conjecture that process regularities in the data a propensity to make private offers and to bargain up to deadline approximate the strategic influence of sequential offer restriction and of time discounting.".
- catalog extent "28 p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard University. Graduate School of Business Administration. Division of Research) ; 01-018.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 01-018".
- catalog issued "2000".
- catalog issued "c2000.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog title "How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games / Kathleen Valley, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons, Max H. Bazerman.".
- catalog type "text".