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- catalog abstract ""In 1995 Michael Tye proposed a theory of phenomena consciousness now known as representationalism. This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. Tye's focus is broader than representationalism, however. Two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In part I of this book, Tye suggests that these challenges are intimately related. The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. Part II of the book is devoted to representationalism. Part III connects representationalism with two more general issues. The first is the nature of color. Tye defends a commonsense, objectivist view of color and argues that such a view is compatible with modern color science. In the final chapter, Tye addresses the question of where on the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases, arguing that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such relatively simple creatures as the honeybee."--Jacket.".
- catalog contributor b11915967.
- catalog created "c2000.".
- catalog date "2000".
- catalog date "c2000.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c2000.".
- catalog description ""In 1995 Michael Tye proposed a theory of phenomena consciousness now known as representationalism. This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. Tye's focus is broader than representationalism, however. Two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In part I of this book, Tye suggests that these challenges are intimately related. The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. Part II of the book is devoted to representationalism. Part III connects representationalism with two more general issues. The first is the nature of color. Tye defends a commonsense, objectivist view of color and argues that such a view is compatible with modern color science. In the final chapter, Tye addresses the question of where on the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases, arguing that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such relatively simple creatures as the honeybee."--Jacket.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. [187]-192) and indexes.".
- catalog description "Preface -- I. Challenges to Reductive Theories of Consciousness -- 1. Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument -- 2. The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion -- II. Representationalism -- 3. Representationalism: The Theory and Its Motivations -- 4. Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? -- 5. On Moderation in Matters Phenomenal: Shoemaker and Inverted Qualia -- 6. Swampman Meets Inverted Earth -- III. Color and Simple Minds -- 7. On Some Alleged Problems for Objectivism about Color -- 8. The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee? -- References -- Name Index -- Subject Index.".
- catalog extent "xiii, 198 p. :".
- catalog identifier "0262201291 (hc : alk. paper)".
- catalog isPartOf "Representation and mind".
- catalog issued "2000".
- catalog issued "c2000.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press,".
- catalog subject "126 21".
- catalog subject "Affect.".
- catalog subject "B808.9 .T94 2000".
- catalog subject "Color (Philosophy)".
- catalog subject "Color.".
- catalog subject "Consciousness.".
- catalog subject "Mental representation.".
- catalog subject "Philosophy.".
- catalog tableOfContents "Preface -- I. Challenges to Reductive Theories of Consciousness -- 1. Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument -- 2. The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion -- II. Representationalism -- 3. Representationalism: The Theory and Its Motivations -- 4. Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? -- 5. On Moderation in Matters Phenomenal: Shoemaker and Inverted Qualia -- 6. Swampman Meets Inverted Earth -- III. Color and Simple Minds -- 7. On Some Alleged Problems for Objectivism about Color -- 8. The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee? -- References -- Name Index -- Subject Index.".
- catalog title "Consciousness, color, and content / Michael Tye.".
- catalog type "text".