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• catalog abstract ""Rules proliferate; some are kept with bureaucratic stringency bordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular circumstances that they ignore?" "The two dominant models in the current literature on rules are the particularist account, which rejects the relevance of genuine rules, and that which sees the application of rules as standard. Taking a position that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman is the first to provide a systematic framework to clarify when we need to follow rules in our moral, legal, and prudential decisions and when we ought not to do so. The book distinguishes among various types of rules; it illuminates concepts such as integrity, self-interest, and self-deception; and finally, it provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules." "This book will be of great interest to advanced students and professionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory, and the social sciences."--BOOK JACKET.".
• catalog contributor b12278527.
• catalog created "2002.".
• catalog date "2002".
• catalog date "2002.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "2002.".
• catalog description ""Rules proliferate; some are kept with bureaucratic stringency bordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular circumstances that they ignore?" "The two dominant models in the current literature on rules are the particularist account, which rejects the relevance of genuine rules, and that which sees the application of rules as standard. Taking a position that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman is the first to provide a systematic framework to clarify when we need to follow rules in our moral, legal, and prudential decisions and when we ought not to do so. The book distinguishes among various types of rules; it illuminates concepts such as integrity, self-interest, and self-deception; and finally, it provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules." "This book will be of great interest to advanced students and professionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory, and the social sciences."--BOOK JACKET.".
• catalog description "1. Moral Rules -- I. Outline of the Task -- II. Types of Rules: Dispensable and Indispensable -- III. Ordinary Moral Consciousness -- IV. Rules as Second-Best Strategies -- V. The Justification of Rules: Strong and Weak -- VI. Interpretation of Weak Rules -- 2. Prudential Rules -- I. Moral and Prudential Rules Compared -- II. Second-Order Prudential Rules: Optimizing -- III. A Prudential Rule to Be Moral -- 3. Legal Rules -- I. Classification -- II. The Descriptive Question: Hart, Dworkin, and Others -- III. The Descriptive Question: Sources of Law -- IV. The Normative Question -- 4. Moral Reasoning without Rules -- I. The Inadequacy of Particularism -- II. Coherence -- III. The Reasoning Process Reviewed -- IV. Objections.".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-201) and index.".
• catalog extent "xi, 210 p. ;".
• catalog identifier "0521807298 (hardback)".
• catalog isPartOf "Cambridge studies in philosophy".
• catalog issued "2002".
• catalog issued "2002.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press,".
• catalog subject "170/.42 21".
• catalog subject "BJ1031 .G67 2001".
• catalog subject "BJ1031 .G67 2002".
• catalog subject "Ethics.".
• catalog subject "Rules (Philosophy)".
• catalog tableOfContents "1. Moral Rules -- I. Outline of the Task -- II. Types of Rules: Dispensable and Indispensable -- III. Ordinary Moral Consciousness -- IV. Rules as Second-Best Strategies -- V. The Justification of Rules: Strong and Weak -- VI. Interpretation of Weak Rules -- 2. Prudential Rules -- I. Moral and Prudential Rules Compared -- II. Second-Order Prudential Rules: Optimizing -- III. A Prudential Rule to Be Moral -- 3. Legal Rules -- I. Classification -- II. The Descriptive Question: Hart, Dworkin, and Others -- III. The Descriptive Question: Sources of Law -- IV. The Normative Question -- 4. Moral Reasoning without Rules -- I. The Inadequacy of Particularism -- II. Coherence -- III. The Reasoning Process Reviewed -- IV. Objections.".
• catalog title "Practical rules : when we need them and when we don't / Alan H. Goldman.".
• catalog type "text".