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• catalog abstract ""In this book, Michael Thau shows that philosophers and cognitive scientists have been fundamentally mistaken about the nature of consciousness and cognition - until now." "Contemporary research in philosophy and cognitive science starts from a very natural conception of the mind. Mental phenomena are conceived of as particulars that put subjects in mediated relations to their world. The materialist takes these particulars to reside in the brain, while the dualist takes them to reside in some kind of non-physical stuff. Given this natural conception, the study of the mind has become the study of these entities. But these entities do not exist and, hence, the study of the mind has become the study of nothing." "Consciousness and Cognition will appeal to anyone interested in the nature of the mind. The book is organized around three famous philosophical puzzles: Spectrum Inversion, Frege's Puzzle, and Black-and-White-Mary. The discussion of Frege's Puzzle contains important insights about linguistic communication, so anyone interested in the fundamental questions in philosophy of language will also find the book illuminating."--Jacket.".
• catalog contributor b12408037.
• catalog created "2002.".
• catalog date "2002".
• catalog date "2002.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "2002.".
• catalog description ""In this book, Michael Thau shows that philosophers and cognitive scientists have been fundamentally mistaken about the nature of consciousness and cognition - until now." "Contemporary research in philosophy and cognitive science starts from a very natural conception of the mind. Mental phenomena are conceived of as particulars that put subjects in mediated relations to their world. The materialist takes these particulars to reside in the brain, while the dualist takes them to reside in some kind of non-physical stuff. Given this natural conception, the study of the mind has become the study of these entities. But these entities do not exist and, hence, the study of the mind has become the study of nothing." "Consciousness and Cognition will appeal to anyone interested in the nature of the mind. The book is organized around three famous philosophical puzzles: Spectrum Inversion, Frege's Puzzle, and Black-and-White-Mary. The discussion of Frege's Puzzle contains important insights about linguistic communication, so anyone interested in the fundamental questions in philosophy of language will also find the book illuminating."--Jacket.".
• catalog description "1. Spectrum Inversion -- 1. Two views on perception -- 2. Spectrum inversion and functionalism -- 3. Spectrum inversion sans functionalism -- 4. The irrelevance of behavioral undetectability: Extending the argument -- 5. Qualia and Fregean senses -- 6. Phenomenology and representational content -- 7. An alternative view of perception -- 8. Generalized use-mention confusion -- 9. Pain and other sensations -- 10. Shoemaker's view -- 2. The Structure of Belief and Perceptual Representation -- 1. Intentionality and paradox -- 2. Intentionality and sense-data theory -- 3. The link to truth and falsity -- 4. The relational nature of belief -- 5. Instantial states vs. internal states -- 6. Against internal belief states -- 7. The possible worlds account of propositions -- 8. Saying and believing -- 9. Perceptual representation -- 10. Perception and the particularizing fallacy -- 11. Intentionality revisited -- 12. The Fregean/Millian distinction and the what/how distinction -- ".
• catalog description "13. Descriptive Fregeanism and non-descriptive Fregeanism -- 14. Guise Millianism and pure Millianism -- 15. Singular propositions -- 16. Explaining the what/how distinction -- 3. Frege's Puzzle -- 1. Four ways of generating Frege's puzzle -- 2. The way that appeals to reasons for behavior -- 3. Two ways the triadist can explain the differences in information conveyed: Differences-in-the-how and differences-about-the-how -- 4. Representational content, qualia, and non-descriptive modes of presentation -- 5. Against differences-about-the-how -- 6. Against differences-in-the-how -- 7. Two false assumptions -- 4. The Structure of Linguistic Communication -- 1. What's implicated and what's said -- 2. The philosophical importance of implicature -- 3. The Gricean paradox and two ways of generating it -- 4. The accessibility of Gricean inferences -- 5. The underdetermination of the inferences -- 6. Dispensing with the inferences -- 7. Semantic value as a theoretical entity -- ".
• catalog description "16. Perceptual representation and dispositionalism about color.".
• catalog description "8. The opacity of semantic value -- 9. Trivial but informative sentences -- 10. True identity statements, belief ascriptions, containing true identity statements, etc -- 11. A kind of conventional implicature -- 5. Black-And-White Mary -- 1. A first pass at the argument -- 2. A response to the argument -- 3. A qualification: Conveying vs. registering -- 4. Reformulating the argument -- 5. First response: Mary gains only non-propositional knowledge -- 6. The relation between Mary's new propositional and non-propositional knowledge -- 7. Seeing objects vs. seeing properties -- 8. Second response: Mary learns about red' -- 9. Third response: Mary lacks the concept red -- 10. Toward the heart of the argument: Dumbing Mary down -- 11. Toward the heart of the argument: Setting Mary free -- 12. At the heart of the argument -- 13. Why we can't name the properties represented in perception -- 14. Looking some color -- 15. The intuition that colors are represented in perception -- ".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 271-276) and index.".
• catalog extent "xiii, 280 p. :".
• catalog identifier "0195141814 (alk. paper)".
• catalog isPartOf "Philosophy of mind series".
• catalog issued "2002".
• catalog issued "2002.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "New York : Oxford University Press,".
• catalog subject "128/.2 21".
• catalog subject "BD418.3 .T42 2002".
• catalog subject "Mental representation.".
• catalog subject "Philosophy of mind.".
• catalog tableOfContents "1. Spectrum Inversion -- 1. Two views on perception -- 2. Spectrum inversion and functionalism -- 3. Spectrum inversion sans functionalism -- 4. The irrelevance of behavioral undetectability: Extending the argument -- 5. Qualia and Fregean senses -- 6. Phenomenology and representational content -- 7. An alternative view of perception -- 8. Generalized use-mention confusion -- 9. Pain and other sensations -- 10. Shoemaker's view -- 2. The Structure of Belief and Perceptual Representation -- 1. Intentionality and paradox -- 2. Intentionality and sense-data theory -- 3. The link to truth and falsity -- 4. The relational nature of belief -- 5. Instantial states vs. internal states -- 6. Against internal belief states -- 7. The possible worlds account of propositions -- 8. Saying and believing -- 9. Perceptual representation -- 10. Perception and the particularizing fallacy -- 11. Intentionality revisited -- 12. The Fregean/Millian distinction and the what/how distinction -- ".
• catalog tableOfContents "13. Descriptive Fregeanism and non-descriptive Fregeanism -- 14. Guise Millianism and pure Millianism -- 15. Singular propositions -- 16. Explaining the what/how distinction -- 3. Frege's Puzzle -- 1. Four ways of generating Frege's puzzle -- 2. The way that appeals to reasons for behavior -- 3. Two ways the triadist can explain the differences in information conveyed: Differences-in-the-how and differences-about-the-how -- 4. Representational content, qualia, and non-descriptive modes of presentation -- 5. Against differences-about-the-how -- 6. Against differences-in-the-how -- 7. Two false assumptions -- 4. The Structure of Linguistic Communication -- 1. What's implicated and what's said -- 2. The philosophical importance of implicature -- 3. The Gricean paradox and two ways of generating it -- 4. The accessibility of Gricean inferences -- 5. The underdetermination of the inferences -- 6. Dispensing with the inferences -- 7. Semantic value as a theoretical entity -- ".
• catalog tableOfContents "16. Perceptual representation and dispositionalism about color.".
• catalog tableOfContents "8. The opacity of semantic value -- 9. Trivial but informative sentences -- 10. True identity statements, belief ascriptions, containing true identity statements, etc -- 11. A kind of conventional implicature -- 5. Black-And-White Mary -- 1. A first pass at the argument -- 2. A response to the argument -- 3. A qualification: Conveying vs. registering -- 4. Reformulating the argument -- 5. First response: Mary gains only non-propositional knowledge -- 6. The relation between Mary's new propositional and non-propositional knowledge -- 7. Seeing objects vs. seeing properties -- 8. Second response: Mary learns about red' -- 9. Third response: Mary lacks the concept red -- 10. Toward the heart of the argument: Dumbing Mary down -- 11. Toward the heart of the argument: Setting Mary free -- 12. At the heart of the argument -- 13. Why we can't name the properties represented in perception -- 14. Looking some color -- 15. The intuition that colors are represented in perception -- ".
• catalog title "Consciousness and cognition / Michael Thau.".
• catalog type "text".