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- catalog contributor b12517615.
- catalog created "c2002.".
- catalog date "2002".
- catalog date "c2002.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c2002.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-297) and index.".
- catalog description "Single Object Auctions -- Private Value Auctions: A First Look -- The Symmetric Model -- Second-Price Auctions -- First-Price Auctions -- Revenue Comparison -- Reserve Prices -- The Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Main Result -- Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Unusual Auctions -- Uncertain Number of Bidders -- Qualifications and Extensions -- Risk-Averse Bidders -- Budget Constraints -- Second-Price Auctions -- First-Price Auctions -- Revenue Comparison -- Asymmetries among Bidders -- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders -- Revenue Comparison -- Efficiency Comparison -- Resale and Efficiency -- Mechanism Design -- Mechanisms -- The Revelation Principle -- Incentive Compatibility -- Individual Rationality -- Optimal Mechanisms -- Setup -- Solution -- Discussion and Interpretation -- Auctions versus Mechanisms -- Efficient Mechanisms -- The VCG Mechanism -- Budget Balance -- An Application to Bilateral Trade -- Auctions with Interdependent Values -- The Symmetric Model -- Second-Price Auctions -- English Auctions -- First-Price Auctions -- Revenue Comparisons -- English versus Second-Price Auctions -- Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions -- Efficiency -- The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle -- The Main Result -- Public Information -- An Alternative Linkage Principle -- Asymmetries and Other Complications -- Failures of the Linkage Principle -- Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions -- Asymmetrically Informed Bidders -- Reserve Prices and Entry Fees.".
- catalog extent "xi, 303 p. :".
- catalog identifier "012426297X".
- catalog issued "2002".
- catalog issued "c2002.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "San Diego : Academic Press,".
- catalog subject "Auction theory.".
- catalog subject "Auctions Mathematical models.".
- catalog subject "Game theory.".
- catalog subject "HF5476 .K75 2002".
- catalog tableOfContents "Single Object Auctions -- Private Value Auctions: A First Look -- The Symmetric Model -- Second-Price Auctions -- First-Price Auctions -- Revenue Comparison -- Reserve Prices -- The Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Main Result -- Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Unusual Auctions -- Uncertain Number of Bidders -- Qualifications and Extensions -- Risk-Averse Bidders -- Budget Constraints -- Second-Price Auctions -- First-Price Auctions -- Revenue Comparison -- Asymmetries among Bidders -- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders -- Revenue Comparison -- Efficiency Comparison -- Resale and Efficiency -- Mechanism Design -- Mechanisms -- The Revelation Principle -- Incentive Compatibility -- Individual Rationality -- Optimal Mechanisms -- Setup -- Solution -- Discussion and Interpretation -- Auctions versus Mechanisms -- Efficient Mechanisms -- The VCG Mechanism -- Budget Balance -- An Application to Bilateral Trade -- Auctions with Interdependent Values -- The Symmetric Model -- Second-Price Auctions -- English Auctions -- First-Price Auctions -- Revenue Comparisons -- English versus Second-Price Auctions -- Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions -- Efficiency -- The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle -- The Main Result -- Public Information -- An Alternative Linkage Principle -- Asymmetries and Other Complications -- Failures of the Linkage Principle -- Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions -- Asymmetrically Informed Bidders -- Reserve Prices and Entry Fees.".
- catalog title "Auction theory / Vijay Krishna.".
- catalog type "text".