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- catalog abstract ""The administrative state is the nexus of American policy making in the postwar period. The vague and sometimes conflicting policy mandates of Congress, the president, and courts get translated into real public policy in the bureaucracy. As the role of the national government has expanded, the national legislature and executive have increasingly delegated authority to administrative agencies to make fundamental policy decisions. How this administrative state is designed, its coherence, its responsiveness, and its efficacy determine, in Robert Dahl's phrase, "who gets what, when, and how." This study of agency design thus has implications for the study of politics in many areas." "The structure of bureaucracies can determine the degree to which political actors can change the direction of agency policy. Politicians frequently attempt to lock their policy preferences into place through insulating structures that are mandated by statute or executive decree. This insulation of public bureaucracies, such as the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Election Commission, and the National Nuclear Security Administration, is essential to understanding both administrative policy outputs and executive-legislative politics in the United States." "This book explains why, when, and how political actors create administrative agencies in such a way as to insulate them from political control, particularly presidential control."--Jacket.".
- catalog contributor b12711277.
- catalog coverage "United States Politics and government 1945-1989.".
- catalog coverage "United States Politics and government 1989-".
- catalog created "c2003.".
- catalog date "2003".
- catalog date "c2003.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c2003.".
- catalog description ""The administrative state is the nexus of American policy making in the postwar period. The vague and sometimes conflicting policy mandates of Congress, the president, and courts get translated into real public policy in the bureaucracy. As the role of the national government has expanded, the national legislature and executive have increasingly delegated authority to administrative agencies to make fundamental policy decisions. How this administrative state is designed, its coherence, its responsiveness, and its efficacy determine, in Robert Dahl's phrase, "who gets what, when, and how." This study of agency design thus has implications for the study of politics in many areas."".
- catalog description ""The structure of bureaucracies can determine the degree to which political actors can change the direction of agency policy. Politicians frequently attempt to lock their policy preferences into place through insulating structures that are mandated by statute or executive decree. This insulation of public bureaucracies, such as the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Election Commission, and the National Nuclear Security Administration, is essential to understanding both administrative policy outputs and executive-legislative politics in the United States." "This book explains why, when, and how political actors create administrative agencies in such a way as to insulate them from political control, particularly presidential control."--Jacket.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 199-209) and index.".
- catalog description "Introduction: Agency Design in American Politics -- Separation of Powers and the Design of Administrative Agencies -- Moving from Insulation in Theory to Insulation in Reality -- Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design -- Testing the Role of Presidents: Presidential Administrative Influence -- Testing the Role of Presidents: Presidential Administrative and Legislative Influence -- Political Insulation and Policy Durability -- Conclusion: What the Politics of Agency Design Tells Us About American Politics -- Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set -- Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Event File -- Agency Data and the Possibility of Sample Selection Bias in Model Estimates.".
- catalog extent "xiii, 224 p. :".
- catalog hasFormat "Presidents and the politics of agency design.".
- catalog identifier "0804745889 (hardcover : alk. paper)".
- catalog identifier "0804745900 (pbk. : alk. paper)".
- catalog isFormatOf "Presidents and the politics of agency design.".
- catalog issued "2003".
- catalog issued "c2003.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press,".
- catalog relation "Presidents and the politics of agency design.".
- catalog spatial "United States Politics and government 1945-1989.".
- catalog spatial "United States Politics and government 1989-".
- catalog spatial "United States.".
- catalog subject "351.73/09/045 21".
- catalog subject "Administrative agencies United States.".
- catalog subject "Bureaucracy United States.".
- catalog subject "JK411 .L49 2003".
- catalog subject "Presidents United States.".
- catalog tableOfContents "Introduction: Agency Design in American Politics -- Separation of Powers and the Design of Administrative Agencies -- Moving from Insulation in Theory to Insulation in Reality -- Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design -- Testing the Role of Presidents: Presidential Administrative Influence -- Testing the Role of Presidents: Presidential Administrative and Legislative Influence -- Political Insulation and Policy Durability -- Conclusion: What the Politics of Agency Design Tells Us About American Politics -- Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set -- Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Event File -- Agency Data and the Possibility of Sample Selection Bias in Model Estimates.".
- catalog title "Presidents and the politics of agency design : political insulation in the United States government bureaucracy, 1946-1997 / David E. Lewis.".
- catalog type "text".