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• catalog abstract ""Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do." "A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behaviour appreciably. This book develops a theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this." "The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing - that is, individually rational, collectively rational, and fair." "The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change."--Jacket.".
• catalog alternative "Strategy of environmental treaty-making".
• catalog contributor b12725764.
• catalog created "2003.".
• catalog date "2003".
• catalog date "2003.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "2003.".
• catalog description ""Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do." "A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behaviour appreciably. This book develops a theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this." "The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing - that is, individually rational, collectively rational, and fair." "The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change."--Jacket.".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. [399]-412) and index.".
• catalog description "The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty and the Theory of International Cooperation -- Transnational Cooperation Dilemmas -- Games with Multiple Equilibria -- Customary Rights and Responsibilities -- International Environmental Agreements -- The Treaty Participation Game -- The Montreal Protocol -- Tipping Treaties -- Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity -- The Depth and Breadth of International Cooperation -- Trade Leakage and Trade Linkage -- The Side Payments Game -- Summary -- Global Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.".
• catalog extent "xvii, 427 p. :".
• catalog identifier "0199257337 (hbk : alk. paper)".
• catalog issued "2003".
• catalog issued "2003.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press,".
• catalog subject "341.7/62 21".
• catalog subject "Environmental law, International.".
• catalog subject "International cooperation.".
• catalog subject "KZ1318 .B37 2003".
• catalog subject "Treaties.".
• catalog tableOfContents "The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty and the Theory of International Cooperation -- Transnational Cooperation Dilemmas -- Games with Multiple Equilibria -- Customary Rights and Responsibilities -- International Environmental Agreements -- The Treaty Participation Game -- The Montreal Protocol -- Tipping Treaties -- Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity -- The Depth and Breadth of International Cooperation -- Trade Leakage and Trade Linkage -- The Side Payments Game -- Summary -- Global Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.".
• catalog title "Environment and statecraft : the strategy of environmental treaty-making / Scott Barrett.".
• catalog title "Strategy of environmental treaty-making".
• catalog type "text".