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• catalog abstract "Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.".
• catalog contributor b12785078.
• catalog created "c2003.".
• catalog date "2003".
• catalog date "c2003.".
• catalog dateCopyrighted "c2003.".
• catalog description "1. Introduction -- 1.1. What is Game Theory Good For? -- 1.2. Three Examples -- 1.3. Experimental Regularity and Behavioral Game Theory -- App. A1.1. Basic Game Theory -- App. A1.2. Experimental Design -- 2. Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games -- 2.1. Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Basic Results -- 2.2. Methodological Variables -- 2.3. Demographic Variables -- 2.4. Culture -- 2.5. Descriptive Variables: Labeling and Context -- 2.6. Structural Variables -- 2.7. Trust Games -- 2.8. Theory -- 3. Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium -- 3.1. Early Studies -- 3.2. Modern Studies -- 3.3. Subjective Randomization and Mixed Strategies -- 3.4. Explicit Randomization.".
• catalog description "Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.".
• catalog description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 497-533) and index.".
• catalog extent "xv, 550 p. :".
• catalog identifier "0691090394 (alk. paper)".
• catalog isPartOf "Roundtable series in behavioral economics.".
• catalog isPartOf "The Roundtable series in behavioral economics".
• catalog issued "2003".
• catalog issued "c2003.".
• catalog language "eng".
• catalog publisher "New York : Russell Sage Foundation ; Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press,".
• catalog subject "330/.01/5193 21".
• catalog subject "Decision making.".
• catalog subject "Game theory.".
• catalog subject "HB144 .C364 2003".
• catalog subject "Negotiation Mathematical models.".
• catalog subject "Statistical decision.".
• catalog tableOfContents "1. Introduction -- 1.1. What is Game Theory Good For? -- 1.2. Three Examples -- 1.3. Experimental Regularity and Behavioral Game Theory -- App. A1.1. Basic Game Theory -- App. A1.2. Experimental Design -- 2. Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games -- 2.1. Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Basic Results -- 2.2. Methodological Variables -- 2.3. Demographic Variables -- 2.4. Culture -- 2.5. Descriptive Variables: Labeling and Context -- 2.6. Structural Variables -- 2.7. Trust Games -- 2.8. Theory -- 3. Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium -- 3.1. Early Studies -- 3.2. Modern Studies -- 3.3. Subjective Randomization and Mixed Strategies -- 3.4. Explicit Randomization.".
• catalog title "Behavioral game theory : experiments in strategic interaction / Colin F. Camerer.".
• catalog type "text".