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- catalog abstract "Consider a cash-constrained and talented individual who must invest in acquiring a skill essential to execute a project. Skill acquisition may be financed by: (a) a corporation, which inserts the project into its pre-existing organization; or (b) a specialist that finances a stand-alone project. The specialist can commit to make talent the residual claimant, thus giving first-best effort incentives. The corporation, on the other hand, can exploit cross-project synergies, but only by centralizing operations, which weakens incentives. Property rights may be weak: talent may leave and develop the project elsewhere after acquiring the skill. In this setup, we systematically study who will finance talent. We show that weak property rights help corporations: for a given level of centralization, both effort and profits increase as property rights weaken. Moreover, we show that whenever the corporation beats the specialist and finances, it is socially efficient.".
- catalog contributor b13193782.
- catalog contributor b13193783.
- catalog contributor b13193784.
- catalog contributor b13193785.
- catalog created "c2003.".
- catalog date "2003".
- catalog date "c2003.".
- catalog dateCopyrighted "c2003.".
- catalog description "Consider a cash-constrained and talented individual who must invest in acquiring a skill essential to execute a project. Skill acquisition may be financed by: (a) a corporation, which inserts the project into its pre-existing organization; or (b) a specialist that finances a stand-alone project. The specialist can commit to make talent the residual claimant, thus giving first-best effort incentives. The corporation, on the other hand, can exploit cross-project synergies, but only by centralizing operations, which weakens incentives. Property rights may be weak: talent may leave and develop the project elsewhere after acquiring the skill. In this setup, we systematically study who will finance talent. We show that weak property rights help corporations: for a given level of centralization, both effort and profits increase as property rights weaken. Moreover, we show that whenever the corporation beats the specialist and finances, it is socially efficient.".
- catalog description "Includes bibliographical references.".
- catalog extent "43 p. :".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research) ; 04-037.".
- catalog isPartOf "Working paper / Division of Research, Harvard Business School ; 04-037".
- catalog issued "2003".
- catalog issued "c2003.".
- catalog language "eng".
- catalog publisher "[Boston] : Division of Research, Harvard Business School,".
- catalog title "Incentives versus synergies in markets for talent / Bharat N. Anand, Alexander Galetovic, Alvaro Stein.".
- catalog type "text".