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- 00711635 abstract "Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits.".
- 00711635 contributor B292638.
- 00711635 contributor B292639.
- 00711635 contributor B292640.
- 00711635 created "[1999]".
- 00711635 date "1999".
- 00711635 date "[1999]".
- 00711635 dateCopyrighted "[1999]".
- 00711635 description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39).".
- 00711635 description "Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits.".
- 00711635 extent "39 p. :".
- 00711635 hasFormat "Also available on the World Wide Web.".
- 00711635 identifier wps2204-abstract.html.
- 00711635 isFormatOf "Also available on the World Wide Web.".
- 00711635 isPartOf "Policy research working paper ; 2204".
- 00711635 isPartOf "Policy research working papers ; 2204.".
- 00711635 issued "1999".
- 00711635 issued "[1999]".
- 00711635 language "eng".
- 00711635 publisher "Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics,".
- 00711635 relation "Also available on the World Wide Web.".
- 00711635 subject "Civil service Salaries, etc. Econometric models.".
- 00711635 subject "HG3881.5.W57 P63 no. 2204".
- 00711635 subject "Political corruption Econometric models.".
- 00711635 title "Corruption under moral hazard / Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele.".
- 00711635 type "text".