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- 2002616085 abstract "Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government decisions that benefit special interest groups, especially government decisions to deal with banking crises. He finds that the better informed the voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the number of political veto players (conditional on the costs to voters of relevant policy decisions), the smaller the government's fiscal transfers are to the financial sector and the less likely the government is to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions.".
- 2002616085 contributor B9493175.
- 2002616085 contributor B9493176.
- 2002616085 created "2001.".
- 2002616085 date "2001".
- 2002616085 date "2001.".
- 2002616085 dateCopyrighted "2001.".
- 2002616085 description "Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government decisions that benefit special interest groups, especially government decisions to deal with banking crises. He finds that the better informed the voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the number of political veto players (conditional on the costs to voters of relevant policy decisions), the smaller the government's fiscal transfers are to the financial sector and the less likely the government is to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions.".
- 2002616085 description "Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-47).".
- 2002616085 description "Mode of access: World Wide Web.".
- 2002616085 hasFormat "Also available in print.".
- 2002616085 identifier view.php?type=5&id=1402.
- 2002616085 isFormatOf "Also available in print.".
- 2002616085 isPartOf "Policy research working paper ; 2543".
- 2002616085 isPartOf "Policy research working papers (Online) ; 2543.".
- 2002616085 issued "2001".
- 2002616085 issued "2001.".
- 2002616085 language "eng".
- 2002616085 publisher "Washington, D.C. : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy,".
- 2002616085 relation "Also available in print.".
- 2002616085 requires "Mode of access: World Wide Web.".
- 2002616085 subject "Banks and banking Political aspects Mathematical models.".
- 2002616085 subject "Financial crises Mathematical models.".
- 2002616085 subject "Fiscal policy Mathematical models.".
- 2002616085 subject "HG3881.5.W57".
- 2002616085 title "When do special interests run rampant? [electronic resource] : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises / Philip Keefer.".
- 2002616085 type "text".