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- 2007014164 contributor B10765688.
- 2007014164 created "2008.".
- 2007014164 date "2008".
- 2007014164 date "2008.".
- 2007014164 dateCopyrighted "2008.".
- 2007014164 description "Includes bibliographical references and index.".
- 2007014164 description "Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis -- Tracking the preferences of political subunits -- Tracking high court preferences -- The fit with prior political science models and empirical data -- Interest groups and collective choice theory -- Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect -- Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.".
- 2007014164 extent "vi, 386 p. :".
- 2007014164 identifier "0674024605 (alk. paper)".
- 2007014164 identifier "9780674024601 (alk. paper)".
- 2007014164 identifier 2007014164.html.
- 2007014164 issued "2008".
- 2007014164 issued "2008.".
- 2007014164 language "eng".
- 2007014164 publisher "Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press,".
- 2007014164 spatial "United States".
- 2007014164 spatial "United States.".
- 2007014164 subject "348.73/2 22".
- 2007014164 subject "KF425 .E44 2008".
- 2007014164 subject "Law United States Interpretation and construction.".
- 2007014164 subject "Statutes United States.".
- 2007014164 tableOfContents "Why courts should maximize enactable preferences when statutes are unclear -- The general theory for current preferences default rules -- Inferring current preferences from recent legislative action -- Inferring current preferences from agency action -- From legislative intent to probabilistic estimates of enactable preferences -- Moderation, unforeseen circumstances, and a theory of meaning -- Eliciting legislative preferences -- Canons favoring the politically powerless -- Linguistic canons of statutory construction -- Interpretations that may create international conflict -- Explaining seeming inconsistencies in statutory stare decisis -- Tracking the preferences of political subunits -- Tracking high court preferences -- The fit with prior political science models and empirical data -- Interest groups and collective choice theory -- Protecting reliance or avoiding change or effect -- Rebutting operational and jurisprudential objections.".
- 2007014164 title "Statutory default rules : how to interpret unclear legislation / Einer Elhauge.".
- 2007014164 type "text".